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Federal Implementation Plans and the Path to
Clean Power
DANIEL P. SELMI*
ABSTRACT
Promulgated under the Clean Air Act in October 2015, the Clean Power
Plan (“CPP”) requires states to significantly reduce carbon emissions from
existing power plants and is the centerpiece of the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (“EPA”) response to global warming. Many states have filed
lawsuits challenging the CPP and some states have vowed that, if those suits
are unsuccessful, they will refuse to implement it. In turn, EPA has proposed
rules that would implement the CPP by imposing a “federal implementation
plan” (“FIP”) upon those recalcitrant states under the authority of the Clean
Air Act. Thus, the success of the CPP may well rest upon this FIP, a regulatory
instrument that academic commentary has almost universally dismissed as
highly ineffective.
This Article first comprehensively examines EPA’s past use of FIPs.
Contrary to accepted belief, EPA has imposed FIPs on numerous occasions
and its use of them has greatly evolved. The Article analyzes this evolution
and finds that FIPs have altered the “cooperative federalism” structure of the
Clean Air Act in important ways. The use of FIPs has centralized more power
at the federal level, afforded EPA considerable experience in designing and
administering market-trading systems, altered the state-centered political
geography of the Clean Air Act, and created new compliance incentives for
states and regulated industries. The Article then employs these conclusions as
a lens through which to examine EPA’s proposed FIP for the CPP. It finds that
the proposed FIP derives logically from EPA’s prior work on FIPs. However,
the Article concludes that the structure and complexities of the Clean Power
Plan raise a series of issues for the proposed FIP that will require difficult
tradeoffs involving competing regulatory goals.

* Fritz B. Burns Professor of Real Property Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. Research for
this Article was principally carried out while the author was the David Sive Visiting Scholar at the Sabin Center
for Climate Change Law, Columbia Law School. The author would like to thank the Sabin Center and Michael
Gerrard for their generous support. He would also like to thank Joseph DiMento, Katherine Trisolini, and
Barbara Baird for their comments. © 2016, Daniel P. Selmi.
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INTRODUCTION
The principal American response to global warming, President Barack Obama’s
Clean Power Plan (“CPP”),1 enlists the venerable Clean Air Act (“CAA” or “the
Act”) as its primary method of implementation. As implemented in Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) rules now under legal challenge,2 the CPP
requires states to create implementation plans demonstrating how those states
will reduce carbon emissions from existing power plants.3 The task is a daunting
one that will require many states to make significant changes in their methods of
generating electricity.
Given the political controversy over the response to climate change, it is
unsurprising that many states have resisted complying with their responsibilities
under the CPP. The resistance has manifested itself in claims ranging from legal
arguments that the CPP exceeds EPA’s authority under the CAA4 to assertions
that the CPP inevitably will lead to brownouts.5 Nationally, U.S. Senator Mitch
McConnell, the Senate Majority Leader, has led the opposition, releasing a letter
sent to the governors of all fifty states urging them to “just say no” to complying
with the Clean Power Plan.6
The CAA anticipates the possibility of state resistance. The Act requires the
federal EPA to set national ambient air quality standards (“NAAQS”) and relies
on states to achieve them.7 However, if state cooperation fails, the Act ultimately

1. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA FACT SHEET: OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN (2014), https://www.epa.
gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-overview.
2. Timothy Cama, Two Dozen States Sue Obama Over Coal Plant Emissions Rule, THE HILL (Oct. 23, 2015,
8:51 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/257856-24-states-coal-company-sue-obama-overclimate-rule.
3. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,
80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan].
4. See, e.g., Amy Harder and Brent Kendall, Obama Carbon Rules to Face Lawsuits, Congressional Tests,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2015, 4:11 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-carbon-rules-to-face-lawsuitscongressional-tests-1445611059.
5. See, e.g., Doug Domenech, The EPA’s Clean Power Plan: A Scheme For Rich White Elitists, WASH.
EXAM’R (June 22, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-epas-clean-power-plan-a-schemefor-rich-white-elitists/article/2566661 (“By forcing fuel switching, the rule will all but guarantee brownouts
during peak usage times—the hottest parts of the summer, the coldest parts of winter.”).
6. Letter from Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senate Majority Leader, to Nat’l Governors Ass’n (Mar. 19,
2015), http://www.mcconnell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/3/senate-majority-leader-mitch-mcconnell-sletter-to-nation-s-governors.
7. Clean Air Act §§ 108–110, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7410 (2014). See also Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common
Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1696 (2001)
(“Cooperative federalism programs set forth some uniform federal standards . . . but leave state agencies with
discretion to implement the federal law, supplement it with more stringent standards, and, in some cases, receive
an exemption from federal requirements.”); CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID MARKELL, REINVENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 19 (2003) (stating that 75% of major federal environmental programs are
administered by states).
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places the responsibility for attaining the air quality standards on EPA.8 If a state
refuses to prepare an implementation plan that would meet those standards, the
Act requires EPA to impose a “federal implementation plan” (“FIP”) that would
attain the standards in the state.9 Consistent with this regulatory fallback
mechanism, when EPA finalized its rules implementing the CPP, it also proposed
rules calling for the agency to adopt FIPs if states refused to adopt plans that
reduce carbon emissions to the levels required by the CPP.10 Accordingly, if the
initial verbal resistance by states to the CPP culminates in a refusal to comply,
EPA has positioned itself to respond by adopting a federal plan under the Act.
The question, then, is whether such a FIP can be effective. There is reason for
some skepticism. EPA gained early experience with FIPs in the 1970s, and that
experience was quite negative. After this time, many commentators dismissed
FIPs as ineffectual and largely irrelevant in the real world.11 Since then, however,
EPA has gained considerable additional experience with FIPs. EPA has now
adopted FIPs on numerous occasions, and the agency’s use of and attitude toward
FIPs have evolved substantially. Over time, EPA has sculpted the FIP into a
valuable regulatory tool.
This Article analyzes the role that FIPs have played in air quality regulation
and how EPA’s experience with them will affect FIPs implementing the Clean
Power Plan. After setting forth the statutory authority for and constraints on FIPs,
the Article examines how EPA’s use of FIPs has evolved over time. It categorizes
the various FIPs into a taxonomy and then details the individual characteristics of
each category of FIPs. The analysis then identifies how these FIPs have altered
the federal structure for implementing the CAA. For example, the FIPs have set
in motion an evolution in which, in some situations, state boundaries have
receded as the center of air quality planning, and federal incentives to reduce air
pollution now strongly influence state regulatory choices. Finally, with this

8. Thus, as one scholar noted, “cooperative federalism” is decidedly one-sided. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN,
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM 9 (1992).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
10. Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Electric Utility Generating Units
Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework Regulations, 80
Fed. Reg. 64,966 (proposed Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 62, 78) [hereinafter Proposed
Clean Power Plan FIP] (proposing FIP to implement GHG emission guidelines for existing fossil-fuel fired
electric generating units).
11. See, e.g., Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., EPA’s Fine Particulate Air Pollution Control Program, 44 ENVTL. L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10996, 11022 (2014) (“FIPs have not played a major role in protecting air quality.”); John P.
Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1216 (1995) (“Since the
1970 enactment of the Clean Air Act, legislators and EPA officials have known that the federal government does
not have, and probably never will have, the resources to implement federal air pollution policy without
considerable state assistance.”); Brigham Daniels, Environmental Regulatory Nukes, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1505,
1520–33 (categorizing FIPs as a “regulatory nuke” and observing that EPA “rarely imposes” them); CRAIG N.
JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 321 (3d ed. 2010) (“EPA has only rarely stepped in to
establish a FIP.”); JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 95 (3d ed.
2010) (calling FIPs a “paper tiger”).
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background in mind, the Article identifies five areas where a proposed CPP FIP
must make difficult choices that seek to accommodate conflicting policies.
I. FEDERAL PLANS UNDER
A.

THE

CLEAN AIR ACT: AUTHORITY AND CONSTRAINTS

THE STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN PROCESS

1. State Plans Under Section 110
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 197012 inaugurated a new relationship
between the federal government and the states in regulating air pollution, a
relationship often referred to as “cooperative federalism.”13 The 1970 CAA
Amendments first required the EPA to establish NAAQS set at a level to protect
human health.14 The 1970 Amendments then tasked states with attaining the
standards15 through the adoption of so-called “State Implementation Plans”
(“SIPs”).16 These plans are collections of control measures on sources of air
pollution that would, in toto, attain the air quality standards.17
From the beginning the SIP process was a difficult one. It required states to
inventory pollution sources, investigate potential control measures, and then
decide upon a mix of control measures on various categories of sources that
would attain the standards.18 Over time, the process of adopting a SIP has become
even more complex.19

12. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2014)) [hereinafter 1970 CAA Amendments].
13. See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 357 (2000)
(“All of the major federal environmental laws divide the authority to implement programs between the federal
and state governments.”); David E. Adelman, Environmental Federalism When Numbers Matter More Than
Size, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 238, 244 (2014) ( “[The CAA] established the model for cooperative
federal-state regulation found in the major national environmental laws.”). Numerous articles discuss environmental federalism. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative
Federalism, 118 YALE L. J. 1256, 1276 (2009) (discussing cooperative federalism under the CAA); Adam
Babich, The Supremacy Clause, Cooperative Federalism, and the Full Federal Regulatory Purpose, 64 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1 (2012).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b).
15. 1970 CAA Amendments, 84 Stat. at 1680.
16. Id. at 1680–81.
17. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 51 (1987) (detailing criteria for the approval of a SIP).
18. See, e.g., Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 67 (1975) (“[A] State’s plan must include
‘emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limitations’; it must also contain such
other measures as may be necessary to insure both timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of the
national ambient air quality standards.”) (quoting the 1970 CAA Amendments § 110(a)(2)(B), 84 Stat. at 1680).
19. See generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation Plans—ThirtySeven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209 (2004) (detailing the evolution of the SIP
process).
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2. State Plans Under Section 111
While most SIPs are submitted under section 110 of the CAA, section 111 of
the Act20 addresses regulation of certain new and existing sources of air
pollution. This section, which applies to the Clean Power Plan, establishes
provisions that in significant respects largely parallel those under section 110.
Section 111(b) requires EPA to establish by regulation “standards of performance”21 for new stationary sources of air pollution.22 In turn, section 111(d)
mandates EPA to adopt standards of performance for any existing stationary
source that would be subject to a standard under section 111(b) if it were a new
source.23 Just as under section 110, section 111 requires states to submit a plan to
EPA that will achieve the emission guidelines established by EPA’s regulations.
Thus, Congress plainly intended that the process for submission of plans under
section 111 would be similar to the process under section 110 of the Act. Both
require states to adopt implementation plans to attain the standards set by EPA.
And, as discussed below, both sections contain similar provisions in the event
that states do not comply with the federal mandate.
B.

THE MANDATE FOR FEDERAL IMPLEMENTATION PLANS

1. The Original Statutory Directives
Congress recognized that attainment of the air quality standards would be
difficult to achieve and that states might prove recalcitrant in adopting the
measures in a SIP needed to assure attainment. Accordingly, the CAA Amendments included a secondary “backup” procedure. If states submitted inadequate
plans, EPA would then intervene and impose a federal implementation plan in
that state.24

20. Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2014).
21. A “standard of performance” is defined as:
a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable
through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of
achieving such reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy
requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.
Id. § 7411(a)(1).
22. Id. § 7411(b)(1). The sources must be part of a list of stationary sources that the Administrator has
promulgated. Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A).
23. Id. § 7411(d). Notably, EPA does not establish standards of performance under section 111(d) for
pollutants which it regulates under section 112 of the Act (hazardous air pollutants) or section 108 of the Act
(criteria air pollutants). As a practical matter, these limitations mean that relatively few pollutants are regulated
under section 111.
24. The relevant statute read at the time:
The Administrator shall, after consideration of any State hearing record, promptly prepare and publish
proposed regulations setting forth an implementation plan, or portion thereof, for a State if—
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After the 1970 Amendments, states no longer exclusively occupied the field of
regulation of stationary sources of air pollution. Rather, if needed, the FIP would
federalize air regulation in areas where it took effect. In the process of imposing a
FIP, EPA would have to allocate emission reductions among various industries,
thus potentially interfering in the operation of state economies.25 Moreover, the
Clean Air Act also empowered citizens to sue EPA to compel the agency to carry
out a nondiscretionary duty to act.26 Citizens have employed this authority on
numerous occasions to obtain judicial orders requiring EPA to promulgate
FIPs.27
While the FIP process has largely concerned state inaction in preparing plans
under section 110 of the Act, the Clean Power Plan proceeds under section 111(d)
of the Act.28 EPA’s CPP rules cite section 111(d) as the source of authority for
regulating carbon emissions from power plants.29 Like the SIP requirement of
section 110, section 111(d) requires each state to submit a plan that “provides for
the implementation and enforcement” of the standard of performance.30
If the state does not submit such a plan under section 111(d), then the EPA
Administrator has “the same authority” to “prescribe a plan for a State . . . as he

(1) the State fails to submit an implementation plan for any national air quality primary or secondary
standard within the time prescribed,
(2) the plan, or any portion thereof, submitted for such State is determined by the Administrator not to
be in accordance with the requirements of this section, or
(3) the State fails, within 60 days after notification by the Administrator or such longer period as he
may prescribe, to revise an implementation plan as required pursuant to a provision of its
plan . . . .
1970 CAA Amendments, 84 Stat. at 1681–82.
25. J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 199 (2d ed. 2010) (“[N]o state
wants to experience [a FIP] because the state would lose control over its desired mix of air pollution control
strategies.”).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a):
(a) Authority to bring civil action; jurisdiction
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may commence a civil action on his
own behalf—
...
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act
or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator . . . .
See also Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 766 (10th Cir. 1980) (“Congress thus restricted
citizens’ suits to actions seeking to enforce specific non-discretionary clear-cut requirements of the Clean Air
Act.”).
27. See, e.g., Proposed Consent Decree, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,076, 64,076 (Dec. 7,
2009) (“The proposed consent decree would settle the complaint filed by Plaintiff for EPA’s alleged failure
either to approve a State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for
California, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Oregon . . . .”).
28. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,710; 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1). See also Robert M. Sussman, Power
Plant Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: A Breakthrough Moment for U.S. Climate Policy?, 32 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 97, 112–13 (2014).
29. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,710.
30. Id. at 64,758.
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would have under section 7410(c).”31 In other words, the Administrator can
prepare a FIP under section 111(d) just as she would under section 110. Section
111(d) thus provides EPA with authority to promulgate FIPs for states that refuse
to comply with the Clean Power Plan rules.
While the statutory language and legislative intent regarding FIPs were clear,
equally apparent is that Congress never seriously thought about the content of
such federal plans or their consequences when it passed the 1970 CAA Amendments.32 Nor did Congress consider the resources that might be necessary to
implement FIPs. And, while the Act required EPA to impose land use and
transportation controls in a federal plan adopted under section 110, Congress did
not grasp the ramifications of authorizing such a federal intrusion into an area
traditionally viewed as the province of state and local governments. Instead, the
point of a FIP apparently was to spur state action by threatening a federal
regulatory takeover. That threat presumably would be sufficient to incentivize
states to create adequate implementation plans and thereby avoid the promulgation of a FIP by EPA.
The FIP process under section 110 was soon tested. States refused to adopt
implementation plans that would take the burdensome steps needed to attain the
air quality standards by the initial 1975 deadline set by the 1970 Amendments.33
Mandated by court orders, EPA then reluctantly proposed federal plans that
immediately generated a firestorm of political opposition34 and a barrage of
litigation.35 Ultimately, Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1977 to extend
the attainment deadlines, and EPA withdrew the federal plans.36
2. Confirmation of the Mandate
The 1977 CAA Amendments retained the FIP mandate but amplified the
circumstances under which a FIP was required. Under those amendments, EPA
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2).
32. For example, the Summary of the Provisions of Conference Agreement for the 1970 CAA Amendments
merely stated: “The Administrator has six months to approve a submitted implementation plan or if no plan is
submitted or the plan is inadequate, to substitute one a plan of his own.” 116 CONG. REC. 32,484–85 (1970).
Similarly, the discussion of key provisions in the Senate bill just called for the Administrator “to either approve
a State plan or decide to substitute his own authority in promulgating a plan . . . .” Id.
33. 1970 CAA Amendments § 110(a)(2)(A), 84 Stat. at 1680.
34. Clean Air Standards: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 100th Cong. 27 (1987) (statement of Lee M. Thomas, Adm’r, EPA) (noting that EPA was “still
trembling” from the public reaction to FIPs proposed for California).
35. See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 828 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (case resulted
from numerous petitions for review of EPA regulations promulgating a transportation control plan for
California); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99
(1977) (challenging FIP for the Baltimore area); Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1975) (challenging
FIP transportation control plan for Pennsylvania); S. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 646 (1st Cir. 1975)
(challenging FIP transportation control plan for the Boston area).
36. Revocation of Gasoline Rationing Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. 45,565 (Oct. 15, 1976) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 52).
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must impose a FIP under section 110 at any time within two years after the
Administrator either (1) “finds that a State has failed to make a required
submission” or the submission “does not satisfy the minimum criteria” established under the Act, or (2) “disapproves a State implementation plan submission
in whole or in part.”37 A state can avoid a FIP only if it submits a legally adequate
SIP and EPA approves that plan before the Administrator promulgates the FIP.
Accordingly, under the 1977 Amendments, EPA’s disapproval of a state’s SIP
submission is not a prerequisite to EPA’s imposing a FIP. Rather, EPA must
impose a FIP whenever it learns that a SIP does not conform to the Act’s
mandates.38 The 1977 Amendments also clarified that EPA did not have to reject
the entire SIP when it imposed a FIP. The Amendments defined a FIP as a
measure to “correct all or a portion of an inadequacy in a State implementation
plan.”39 EPA viewed this definition as codifying a principle otherwise implicit in
the 1970 Amendments.40
Finally, EPA has emphasized the breadth of its FIP authority. The agency has
declared that it may exercise any authority it possesses under section 110(c) of
the Act to “fill gaps left by a state failure” and “to cure a planning inadequacy in
any way not clearly prohibited by statute.”41 It also has declared that the agency

37. Clean Air Act § 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1). The provisions read in full:
(1) The Administrator shall promulgate a Federal implementation plan at any time within 2 years after
the Administrator—
(A) finds that a State has failed to make a required submission or finds that the plan or plan
revision submitted by the State does not satisfy the minimum criteria established under
subsection (k)(1)(A) of this section, or
(B) disapproves a State implementation plan submission in whole or in part, unless the State
corrects the deficiency, and the Administrator approves the plan or plan revision, before the
Administrator promulgates such Federal implementation plan.
38. EPA has recognized this obligation on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Approval and Promulgation of Air
Quality Implementation Plans; States of Michigan and Minnesota; Regional Haze, 78 Fed. Reg. 8478, 8484
(proposed Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (“EPA notes that the agency’s mandate to promulgate
such a FIP applies without regard to whether EPA has disapproved a state submittal. While EPA has proposed to
disapprove Michigan and Minnesota’s regional haze SIPs in this instance, publication of final disapproval of the
states’ submittals is not a prerequisite for promulgating a FIP . . . .”). EPA has, however, adopted the position
that, if it disapproves state submissions that are intended to replace parts of a previously approved plan, then the
disapproval does not trigger a FIP. See, e.g., Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State of
California; 2003 State Strategy and 2003 South Coast Plan for One-Hour Ozone and Nitrogen Dioxide, 74 Fed.
Reg. 10,176 (Mar. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (“The plan elements that are being disapproved
are not required under the Clean Air Act because they represent revisions to previously-approved SIP elements,
and thus, the disapprovals will not affect the requirements for the State to have an approved SIP for these SIP
elements. Therefore, the disapprovals do not trigger . . . EPA’s obligation to promulgate a Federal implementation plan.”).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(y) (emphasis added).
40. Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce the Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 53,694, 56,398
(proposed Oct. 21, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 40 and 98).
41. Approval and Promulgation of State and Federal Implementation Plans; California—Sacramento and
Ventura Ozone; South Coast Ozone and Carbon Monoxide; Sacramento Ozone Area Reclassification, 59 Fed.
Reg. 23264, 23290 (proposed May 5, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52 and 81199481) [hereafter
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“may exercise its own, independent regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act
in any way not clearly prohibited by an explicit provision of the Act.”42
C.

THE CLEAN POWER PLAN

In June 2014, EPA proposed regulations that would implement President
Obama’s Clean Power Plan by limiting carbon emissions from power plants,43
and in August 2015, the agency adopted final regulations.44 Under section 111(d)
of the Act, the “standards of performance” established by EPA must reflect the
“best system of emissions reductions [“BSER”] . . . adequately demonstrated”
for a particular pollutant and a particular group of sources.45 Here, the pollutant is
carbon dioxide (“CO2”), and the sources are fossil fuel-fired electric generating
units (“EGUs”).46
EPA determined the BSER for the CPP by examining existing technologies and
measures. The agency found that it could reduce carbon emissions from existing
power plants by using three so-called “building blocks”: (1) increasing the
operational efficiency of coal-fired power plants; (2) shifting electricity generation from higher emitting fossil fuel-fired power plants (usually coal-fired plants)
to lower-emitting, natural gas-fired plants; and (3) increasing electricity generation from renewable sources of energy like wind and solar.47 Here, EPA used the
Sacramento and Ventura Ozone]. EPA has also stated that “the Courts have held that EPA may exercise all
authority that the State may exercise under the Act,” id., and that the agency “stands in the shoes of the
defaulting State, and all of the rights and duties that would otherwise fall to the State accrue instead to EPA,” id.
(quoting Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531, 1541 (9th Cir. 1993)). These statements,
however, may well be overbroad given the limitations imposed by later cases construing the Tenth Amendment.
See infra section I.D.1.
42. Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce the Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,398. At the
same time, however, measures that are solely within state authority are not available to EPA when it promulgates
a FIP. These include measures related to land use, as the 1977 CAA Amendments barred EPA from undertaking
review of “indirect sources” of air pollution such as shopping malls. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 108(e), 91 Stat. 685,
695–96 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(5)(A)(ii) (1988)). See generally Philip E. Rothschild,
Comment, The Clean Air Act and Indirect Source Review: 1970–1991, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 337
(1992).
43. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,
79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (proposed June 8, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
44. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,662. For a summary of previous EPA actions that led to these
regulations, see Tomás Carbonell, EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan: Protecting Climate and Public Health by
Reducing Carbon Pollution from the U.S. Power Sector, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 403, 405–08 (2014). See also
PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM, POWER SECTOR CARBON POLLUTION STANDARDS (June 25, 2013), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/presidential-memorandum-power-sector-carbon-pollutionstandards.
45. Clean Air Act § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2014).
46. EPA established emission performance rates for two subcategories of affected EGUs: (1) fossil fuel-fired
electric utility steam generating units, and (2) stationary combustion turbines. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. at
64,667.
47. Id. “These three building blocks are approaches that are available to all affected EGUs, either through
direct investment or operational shifts or through emissions trading where states . . . incorporat[e] emissions
trading.” Id.
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BSER to establish CO2 emission rates for two subcategories power plants.48 EPA
then turned these BSER rates into a “rate-based” CO2 goal that applies to the
individual power plans in each state.49 At the same time, it set an alternative
“mass-based” goal that established a statewide limit on emissions.50
Affected EGUs—individually, in the aggregate, or in combination with other
measures implemented by the state—must achieve one of these goals.51 The final
Clean Power Plan regulations establish several ways for states to do so. Most
importantly, they can do so by adopting emission standards that meet either the
rate-based goal or the mass-based goal established for each individual state.52
The mass-based goal is particularly attractive, since previous emissions trading
programs have used mass-based goals.53 To further assist states, EPA in a
separate regulation proposed mass- and rate-based model rules that states could
choose to adopt or modify, and then submit to EPA for approval.54
D.

THE CONSTRAINTS ON FEDERAL ACTION

In implementing the Clean Power Plan, EPA faces the likely possibility that it
will have to impose FIPs on recalcitrant states. But EPA must contend with
significant constitutional and practical constraints in administering FIPs.
1. The Expanded Tenth Amendment
EPA’s statutory authority to promulgate a FIP is not the end of the story, for the
agency then must put that FIP into effect. For example, EPA must ensure that the
permits for individual sources of air pollution regulated by the FIP incorporate
the emission limitations in the FIP. EPA also must monitor emissions from
sources subject to the FIP and, if necessary, take action to enforce the FIP. All of
these actions are in lieu of regulation by a state’s environmental agency, which

48. EPA established an emission performance rate of 1,305 lb CO2/MWh for fossil fuel-fired steam
generating units, and 771 lb CO2/MWh for stationary combustion turbines. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 64,668. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: CLEAN POWER PLAN AND THE ROLE OF STATES 2
(2015), https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-and-role-states (“One cost-effective
way that states can meet their goals is emissions trading, through which affected power plants may meet their
emission standards via emission rate credits (for a rate-based standard) or allowances (for a mass-based
standard).”).
53. Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & Ronald M. Varnum, State Implementation of the Clean Power Plan: Why it
Matters to Industries Outside the Power Sector, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11008, 11010 (2015) (“No
trading program established to date has involved rate averaging over a universe of regulated and unregulated
stationary sources. Moreover, the CPP makes it clear that trading may not occur between states employing
mass-based trading programs and those employing rate-based programs, so that adoption of a rate-based trading
approach would preclude trading [between the existing GHG trading programs in California and the
Northeast].”).
54. Proposed Clean Power Plan FIP, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,966.
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nonetheless will continue to regulate sources that are not subject to the FIP.
Further, EPA personnel might be relatively unfamiliar with the sources that the
FIP has now committed them to regulating, requiring EPA to allocate significant
personnel resources to the task of FIP implementation.
EPA’s burden would considerably lighten, of course, if it could rely upon the
state regulatory agencies to implement FIPs. In early FIPs, EPA generally
assumed that state agencies would implement the FIP’s regulatory system. As
EPA’s attitude towards FIPs evolved in later years, however, its ability to rely on
state agencies for implementation became highly questionable as the constraints
imposed on the agency by the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution substantially expanded.
The Tenth Amendment declares that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”55 When EPA under judicial compulsion
began drafting FIPs in 1974 that included transportation plans and land use
controls, states challenged EPA’s action as violating the Tenth Amendment. In
response, some courts found that EPA’s FIPs so interfered with state sovereignty
as to violate the Tenth Amendment, while others interpreted the Act to avoid the
constitutional problem.56 The 1977 Amendments to the Act mooted the issue for
the moment, but the seriousness of the Tenth Amendment issue was evident.57
Thereafter, a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions expanded the reach of the
Tenth Amendment and sharply curtailed EPA’s ability to enlist states in the
implementation of a FIP. The first was New York v. United States,58 which found
that the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act violated the Tenth
Amendment by requiring a state to either “take title” to radioactive waste under
certain circumstances or to regulate as Congress specified. The Court notably
55. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
56. Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 834 (9th Cir. 1975) vacated 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (“A diligent search of the
sections of the Clean Air Act fails to reveal a single instance in which Congress explicitly has vested in the
Administrator power to compel the states to administer and enforce regulations promulgated by him designed to
govern polluters, potential or actual, other than the state, municipality, or political subdivision of the
state . . . .”); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 228 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated sub. nom, EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99
(1977) (“But in the promulgation of its own plan, the EPA may not, under the statute, direct Maryland to act in
the manner and form prescribed under these regulations. This would be construing the statute to have a breadth
Congress never intended. Inviting Maryland to administer the regulations, and compelling her to do so under
threat of injunctive and criminal sanctions, are two entirely different propositions . . . .”).
57. Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 263 (3d Cir. 1974):
We therefore conclude that the application of the federal enforcement procedures to the Commonwealth for noncompliance with the regulations contained in the Pennsylvania Transportation Control
Plan is a valid exercise of the federal commerce power. We recognize that there may remain a
legitimate concern for possible intrusions upon the proper functioning of our federalist system as a
result of future developments in the implementation of the Clean Air Act, and this court will remain
ready to protect that concern in any appropriate case.
Id.
58. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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warned that “Congress may not simply “commandee[r] the legislative processes
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program.”59
Later decisions strengthened the Tenth Amendment’s limitations on federal
action. The key decision was Printz v. United States,60 in which the Court found
that provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act violated the Tenth
Amendment by enlisting local sheriffs in its enforcement. The enlistment was
minimal; the Act merely required local officers to conduct background checks on
handgun applicants and to accept applicants’ statements from firearm dealers.
Nonetheless, the Court found that these requirements violated the Tenth Amendment. The five-justice majority proclaimed a broad principle: “[T]he Federal
Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive
action, federal regulatory programs.”61
These cases have important implications for FIPs adopted by EPA. Unquestionably, EPA can impose emission limits on sources through a FIP. But the Tenth
Amendment’s “anti-commandeering” principle renders it very unlikely that EPA
could demand that states take any significant action to implement these measures.
The Printz decision calls into question even minor reliance by EPA on the state
regulatory system to administer a FIP.62
The Tenth Amendment, however, is not nearly the only obstacle to implementing a FIP. State efforts to oppose the Clean Power Plan can extend even further in
other directions.
2. The Rise of Uncooperative Federalism
Courts and scholars often label the Clean Air Act as a model of “cooperative
federalism,”63 a somewhat elastic term that encompasses several different pre59. Id. at 161 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
60. 521 U.S. 898 (1996).
61. Id. at 925. At the same time, the Court began limiting Congress’s ability to condition funding to states on
their compliance with federal law. This issue came to a head in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607–08 (2012), a challenge to the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (commonly known as “Obamacare”). The Act’s provisions withdrew all Medicaid funding
from states that chose not to participate. The Court found that this measure violated the Spending Clause of the
U.S. Constitution by not giving the states a real choice about whether to participate; instead, the Act amounted
to “economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce . . . .” Id. at 2605. Some now
argue that the Clean Air Act violates the Spending Clause by unconstitutionally coercing states into compliance
by threatening a loss of federal highway funding. See, e.g., Eric Turner, Protecting from Endless Harm: A
Roadmap for Coercion Challenges after N.F.I.B. v. Sebelius, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 503, 529–32 (2014).
62. Virginia challenged the constitutionality of EPA actions disapproving part of its SIP. Virginia v. United
States, 74 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of case on the grounds that exclusive jurisdiction for
such challenges lay in the court of appeals under section 307 of the Act).
63. See, e.g., GenOn REMAR, LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513, 516 (3d Cir. 2013) (“This ‘cooperative
federalism’ structure is a defining feature of the statute.”); Luminant Generation Co. v. EPA, 675 F.3d 917, 921
(5th Cir. 2012) (terming the Clean Air Act an “experiment in cooperative federalism”) (citing Michigan v. EPA,
268 F.3d 1075, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
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cepts. At its core, cooperative federalism involves state implementation of
federally established standards.64 States often possess significant discretion in
how they go about that implementation effort,65 and the federal law involved may
contain incentives for states to undertake implementation.66 Furthermore, in
some instances the federal law establishes minimum regulatory standards, and
states can adopt more stringent standards if they wish.67 However, there is an
important limitation on state discretion. If states decline to implement those
standards, then the federal government will step in and implement them.68
Critics of environmental federalism have pointed out that the “cooperation” in
cooperative federalism is often decidedly one-sided.69 The Clean Air Act—often
cited as a prime example of cooperative federalism70—significantly constrains
state discretion. For example, the Act preempts states from regulating certain
sources of air pollution. EPA sets “new source performance standards” for new
stationary sources of air pollution71 and regulates automobile emissions from
new automobiles.72 The Act largely relegates states to regulating existing sources
of air pollution.73
In recent years, however, academics have observed that states subject to
“cooperative federalism” laws do not face the binary choice of either cooperating
with the federal government or having the federal government take over implementation of the program in question. Instead, states playing the role of federal
servant in such regulatory schemes can actively oppose or resist implementation

64. See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 179, 190 (2005) (“The narrow conception [of cooperative federalism] focuses on programs in which the
federal government establishes minimum standards that states may opt to implement through programs that are
no less stringent.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (defining cooperative federal laws as
ones that “offer States the choice of regulating [certain] activity according to federal standards or having state
law pre-empted by federal regulation”).
65. Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to
Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1002–03 (1995) (“In some situations Congress can even use
state intermediaries as a means of preserving a significant role for state discretion in achieving specified federal
goals, where the alternative is complete federal preemption of any state regulatory role.”).
66. Fischman, supra note 64, at 189 (“A carrot-and-stick approach to inducements is fundamental to
cooperative federalism under any conception. The federal government may offer significant incentives for
implementation, such as funding for state environmental agencies or opportunities for local officials to tailor
requirements . . . .”).
67. Id. at 191 (a component of cooperative federalism “is the federal stringency floor by which states may
tailor pollution control programs to be stricter, but not more lax, than the federal standards . . . .”).
68. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (“If a State does not
wish to submit a proposed permanent program that complies with the Act and implementing regulations, the full
regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal Government . . . .”).
69. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 8, at 9.
70. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 11, at 1193–99 (lengthy discussion of cooperative federalism under the
CAA).
71. Clean Air Act § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2014); see 40 C.F.R. pt. 60.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 7521; see 40 C.F.R. pt. 85.
73. Adelman, supra note 13, at 244 (suggesting that states face significant “political and administrative
barriers” in regulating small stationary sources).
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of federal policy. A leading article termed this response “uncooperative
federalism.”74
State resistance can take a variety of forms, ranging from “restrained disagreement to fighting words.”75 The arenas for state resistance can also vary, encompassing political or administrative resistance, or judicial challenge to federal
action.76 An important factor supporting state resistance is that, while cooperative
federalism schemes promise a federal takeover of the program if states decline to
act, in many instances the federal government simply has neither the resources
nor the knowledge to carry out that threat.77 If the federal government has come
to depend on states to implement federal law, states possess a heightened ability
to resist that implementation through uncooperative federalism by calling the
federal government’s “bluff” about a federal takeover.78
Uncooperative federalism has increased over time in the implementation of the
Clean Air Act. The political consensus supporting the actions required by the Act
has substantially weakened, and attacks on EPA’s oversight role under the CAA
have proliferated.79 At the same time, EPA has now employed the Act as the
principal tool in its response to global warming. It found that carbon emissions
present an endangerment to public health under the Act80 and adopted the Clean
Power Plan to curb those emissions.81
The CPP has provoked the strongest form of uncooperative federalism: active
resistance by a significant number of states. Those states publicly declared that
they will not comply with mandates under the Act and have sued to overturn EPA

74. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 13, at 1258–59 (“Uncooperative federalism occurs when
states . . . implementing federal environmental law use that power to push federal authorities to take a new
position . . . .”); see, e.g., Ernest A. Young, A Research Agenda for Uncooperative Federalists, 48 TULSA L. REV.
427, 428 (2013) (“Although state officials in such a role [implementing federal regulatory and benefit schemes]
are nominally subservient to federal authority, they nonetheless retain considerable power to block or slow
down the implementation of federal policy . . . .”).
75. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 13, at 1271.
76. See Barak Y. Orbach et al., Arming States’ Rights: Federalism, Private Lawmakers, and the Battering
Ram Strategy, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1161, 1168 (2010) (“States and localities, moving in coalition or unilaterally,
may attack federal laws by enacting state declaratory laws or laws that directly conflict with and challenge
unpopular federal laws. They also may litigate unpopular federal regulatory choices.”).
77. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers
Revisited, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1654 (2012) (“Indeed, the empirical reality is that federal agencies almost never
suspend state primacy, once it is established . . . .”).
78. Id. See also Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 13, at 1267 (“While the federal government may
threaten to administer a program itself if the state does not cede to its demands, its capacity to do so is often
limited, and the state may call Congress’s bluff.”).
79. See, e.g., Christopher D. Ahlers, Presidential Authority over EPA Rulemaking under the Clean Air Act, 44
ENVTL. L. 31 (2014) (discussing controversies within the Executive Branch over EPA actions promulgating
national ambient air quality standards).
80. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed.
Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I).
81. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,663.
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regulations implementing the CPP on both statutory and constitutional grounds.82
As mentioned above, politicians have stoked the resistance with calls for states to
“just say no” to the Clean Power Plan. Indeed, the partisan political nature of the
opposition to the CPP is evident and, under uncooperative federalism, is especially likely where one political party controls states that must comply with the
federal plans promulgated by the opposition party.83 States can “channel[]
partisan conflict through federalism’s institutional framework.”84
States’ opposition to the Clean Power Plan presents a significant challenge for
EPA. As noted above, the assumption has generally been that, in the end, federal
agencies will have great difficulty taking over state programs, and commentators
have stressed the need for cooperation between EPA and the states in combatting
global warming.85 Here, with respect to the CPP, that cooperation has not been
forthcoming from many states; accordingly, much will depend on EPA’s ability to
implement the plan through FIPs. One important question is whether EPA could
design the FIPs in a way that might, at least in some respects, overcome some
aspects of the state opposition.
3. The Aging of the Clean Air Act
A final factor has affected the development of federal implementation plans
over the last forty years. It might be termed the aging of the Clean Air Act. As the
Act has been implemented, significant changes have occurred in both the nature
of the air pollution problem that the Act addresses and the efforts needed to attain
the national ambient air quality standards.
The 1970 Amendments initially mandated states to attain the NAAQS by 1975,
which in hindsight was an impossible task. Since then, Congress has twice
amended the law to extend the attainment dates. While these extensions may have
reduced the pressure on states to attain the standards, the interim period has
brought a much-enhanced understanding of the nature and extent of air pollution.

82. Joby Warrick, States Sue to Block EPA’s Pollution Rule, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2015, at A02 (“More than
two dozen states filed lawsuits Friday seeking to block the Obama administration’s signature climate-change
regulation in a wave of opposition.”).
83. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1081 (2014) (arguing that party
politics drives states to contest federal government programs); see also Young, supra note 74, at 429 (“Groups
that are in the minority nationally may nonetheless constitute a majority in a particular state, so that federalism’s
reservation of important governmental prerogatives to states offers those minorities an opportunity to
implement their dissenting vision.”).
84. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 83, at 1081.
85. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama
Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 285 (2011) (“Cooperative federalism’s greatest advantage as a basis for
climate change regulation is its ability to create coordinated multiscalar action in which each actor provides its
unique contribution.”); Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change Legislation:
The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 792 (2008) (presenting “theoretical
and practical justifications for a cooperative federalist approach that strives to avoid the weaknesses and build
on the strengths of each level of government.”).
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This period has also afforded time for the development of new control technologies, and both EPA and state air pollution agencies have become much more
sophisticated in carrying out the CAA. Furthermore, the regulation of emissions
from automobiles over the last forty years has become a major success story. New
automobiles emit a fraction of the pollution that they did in 1970,86 and this
reduction has improved air quality even as the number of vehicles on the road has
greatly increased.87 As a result of these developments, the gap has shrunk
between existing air quality and the air quality needed to attain the standards.
Attainment, while difficult, no longer seems impossible.
Another change in the Act’s implementation has been a renewed emphasis on
addressing interstate pollution. This change began with the effort under the Clean
Air Act to control acid rain,88 which largely concerned pollution from power
plants that crossed state lines and damaged forests.89 Later, EPA began grappling
with regional haze, a problem caused by transported pollution that threatened
vistas at national parks in the west,90 and then with cross-state transport of air
pollutants in the East.
This heightened focus on interstate pollution had two important effects. First,
EPA successfully implemented a so-called “marketable trading system” to
address the acid rain problem.91 This system promised greater flexibility for
sources attempting to meet air quality standards. It also minimized costs, as
sources could either control pollution or trade for pollution credits.92
Second, the trading system streamlined implementation. Enforcement now
focused on accounting for emissions rights at the end of regulatory periods rather
than on assessing the economic and technological feasibility of control methods.93 The Act did allow so-called “technology forcing,” which empowers states

86. Progress Cleaning the Air and Improving People’s Health, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
clean-air-act-overview/progress-cleaning-air-and-improving-peoples-health (last updated Sept. 6, 2016) (“Compared to 1970 vehicle models, new cars, SUVs and pickup trucks are roughly 99 percent cleaner for common
pollutants (hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides and particle emissions).”).
87. See generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 309 (2000).
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o.
89. See, e.g., Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward
Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 399 (2009) (summarizing the U.S. Acid Rain Program).
90. In January 2009, EPA found that 37 states had failed to submit SIPs addressing regional haze by the
deadline set in the CAA. Finding of Failure to Submit State Implementation Plans Required by the 1999
Regional Haze Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 2392, 2393 (Jan. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). See John
Copeland Nagle, The Scenic Protections of the Clean Air Act, 87 N.D. L. REV. 571 (2011).
91. Overview of the Acid Rain Program, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/acid-rainprogram (last updated June 16, 2016) (discussing the program).
92. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade Complementary Policies,
49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 218–19 (2012) (describing the Acid Rain Program as “[b]y far the most successful
and lauded domestic market-based program to date”).
93. See, e.g., D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62
IOWA L. REV. 771, 805–831 (1977); David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean
Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740, 766 (1983) (“The Act’s failure to deal with the allocation of duties undercut the
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to force regulated sources to develop technology that presently does not exist.94
However, both EPA and the states were concerned that the economic cost of
technology forcing might cause sources to shut down. As a result, both EPA and
the states tended to focus on presently available technology in setting regulatory
limits. This approach changed markedly with the advent of market-based
regulation through cap and trade. Now, the available technology merely establishes the level at which emission rights are initially allocated.
In summary, EPA’s development of its FIP authority occurred against a
backdrop of important legal and regulatory changes affecting air quality regulation. With that background in mind, the discussion now turns to EPA’s experience
with FIPs since the CAA Amendments of 1970. That experience will inform
EPA’s use of its FIP power to implement the Clean Power Plan.
II. THE EVOLUTION

OF

FEDERAL IMPLEMENTATION PLANS

EPA’s development of federal implementation plans proceeded through a
series of phases in which the agency’s attitude towards FIPs evolved substantially. The phases were not chronologically distinct, as the use of FIPs for
different purposes sometimes overlapped. Still, examining the FIPs in a discrete
typology illuminates the factors underlying the evolution of FIPs.
A.

EVASION FIPS

1. Forced Plans
The 1970 CAA Amendments required attainment of the NAAQS over an
impossibly short time period.95 States with highly polluted areas realized that the
standards could be attained only through massive intervention into the state
economy and drastic limits on automobile use. Rather than face those decisions,
states chose to submit legally insufficient SIPs to EPA. EPA was well aware of
both the substantial obstacles to reaching attainment and the political fallout that
would accompany draconian FIPs. As a result, EPA did not respond to the
inadequate SIPs by preparing FIPs as the Act required.

pivotal concept of ‘technology forcing,’ which depends on the imposition of tough emission limits to prod
development of better ways to control pollution.”).
94. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976). The Court held that claims of economic and
technological infeasibility were “to be wholly foreign to the Administrator’s consideration of a state
implementation plan.” Id. at 256. Such claims were proper before the state when it was formulating the state
implementation plan. Id. at 266.
95. See Carolyn McNiven, Using Severability Clauses to Solve the Attainment Deadline Dilemma in
Environmental Statutes, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1255, 1266–67 (1992) (discussing the attainment deadlines of the 1970
CAA Amendments).
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Environmentalists reacted to EPA’s avoidance in a manner that quickly
developed into a recurring pattern. They sued under section 304 of the Act96
claiming that EPA’s refusal to promulgate a FIP constituted a failure to perform a
non-discretionary duty required by the Act. In response, courts ordered the
preparation of FIPs for Southern California and several other highly polluted
urban areas.97 These constituted the first wave of FIPs prepared under the Act.
These initial FIPs shared a common feature: they required regulatory actions that
would deeply intrude into state economies by, among other requirements,
restricting traffic and limiting gasoline use.
The FIP for Southern California, promulgated in response to a court order,
exemplifies this first generation of so-called “forced” FIPs. In May 1972, the EPA
Administrator disapproved the California SIP for failing to demonstrate attainment.98 After EPA thereafter failed to promulgate a FIP within six months,
environmentalists secured a court order mandating EPA action.99
EPA responded by proposing a FIP that was plainly unrealistic and politically
infeasible.100 In Southern California, EPA’s FIP included traffic-control measures
that would have required a reduction of over 80 percent in miles traveled by
motor vehicles.101 EPA then revised the proposal into several options. One would
have imposed 100% gas rationing, while another would have limited gasoline
consumption to 1972–1973 levels and introduced additional transportationcontrol measures.102 Yet a third proposal commandeered freeway lanes and
surface streets exclusively for use by buses and carpools, and also surcharged
parking spaces.
EPA simultaneously proclaimed the agency’s opposition to its own plan. The
EPA Administrator, William Ruckelshaus, stressed that the agency had been
96. Clean Air Act § 304(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (2014); see Roger A. Greenbaum & Anne S. Peterson,
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Citizen Suits and How They Work, 2 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 79
(1991).
97. City of Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 4 E.R.C. 1728 (C.D. Cal. 1972); see also Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289
(5th Cir. 1974) (ordering Texas FIP); S. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974) (ordering Boston
FIP).
98. Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; California—South Coast Air Basin; Ozone and
Carbon Monoxide Plans, 53 Fed. Reg. 49,497 (Dec. 7, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) [hereinafter
South Coast 1988 ANPRM] (“California submitted its SIP for ozone and CO to EPA in February 1972. In May
of the same year, EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus disapproved the plan because it failed to show
attainment by the deadline stated in the Act 1975.”).
99. City of Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 4 E.R.C. 1728 (C.D. Cal. 1972). Interestingly, one of the plaintiffs was
a city located east of Los Angeles and subject to smog blown from Los Angeles by the prevailing winds.
100. As EPA later stated in reviewing the history of the FIPs, “all but one of [the FIPs] contained extreme
provisions . . . .” Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; California (South Coast Air Basin);
Plans for Ozone and Carbon Monoxide, 55 Fed. Reg. 36,458, 36,465 (Sept. 5, 1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 51 and 52) [hereinafter South Coast 1990 NPRM].
101. California Air Quality Standards—Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 38 Fed. Reg.
2,194, 2,195 (Jan. 22, 1973) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52); see also South Coast 1988 ANPRM, 53 Fed.
Reg. at 49,498 (discussing the earlier plan).
102. South Coast 1988 ANPRM, 53 Fed. Reg. at 49,498.
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forced to create the FIPs under legal duress.103 He had to promulgate the plan
because a court would hold him in contempt if he did not. As Ruckelshaus
famously put it, “[f]aced with the choice between my freedom and your mobility,
my freedom wins.”104 Public hearings held by EPA on its proposed FIP focused
public opposition on it, and that opposition was fierce.105
EPA’s adoption of the plans also sparked a barrage of litigation. EPA’s
authority to impose gas rationing was upheld,106 but Tenth Amendment objections to the plans reached the Supreme Court. These appeals, however, were
ultimately dismissed as moot after EPA withdrew the plans and it became clear
that Congress would amend the CAA. In withdrawing the FIPs, EPA cited the
“seriously disruptive social and economic consequences of such regulations.”107
These forced FIPs played a critical role in the initial development of EPA’s FIP
power. First, EPA became aware of both the knowledge of local conditions and
the administrative resources that were needed to prepare and implement a
large-scale FIP.108 The agency concluded that it was ill-equipped for this
undertaking and should avoid FIPs if at all possible in the future. Congress
confirmed the agency’s conclusion in the Committee Report that led to the 1977
CAA Amendments: “The Federal Government does not have and will not have
the resources to do an effective job of running the air pollution control programs
of the State.”109 These deficiencies in knowledge and resources were real,110 and

103. In commenting on the final plan, the Administrator stated: “The EPA does not believe that massive
gasoline rationing is either socially acceptable or enforceable, and will work toward alleviating the necessity for
such drastic control in 1977.” California Transportation Control Plan, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,232, 31,237 (Nov. 12,
1973) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
104. R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 321–22 (1983).
105. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, POLICY 511 (5th ed. 2006)
(citing EPA’s “disastrous early experiences with FIPs” and noting that “State and public reaction to these plans
was intensely hostile”).
106. City of Santa Rosa v. EPA, 534 F.2d 150, 153 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated sub nom. Pac. Legal Found. v.
EPA, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
107. Revocation of Gasoline Rationing Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. 45,565 (Oct. 15, 1976) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
108. Howard A. Latin, Climate Change Mitigation and Decarbonization, 25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 62 (2014)
(explaining FIPs have “been a very rare occurrence for political, technical, and budgetary reasons”); Ashira
Perlman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 62 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1407 (2012) (“Though states that refused or were
unable to comply with this directive [to include land use and transportation controls] risked having their state
plans preempted by a federal implementation plan (FIP), both the states and the EPA recognized that the threat
was largely illusory. The EPA lacked the administrative resources and localized knowledge necessary to directly
implement this program.”); see Anuradha Sivaram, Why Citizen Suits Against States Would Ensure the
Legitimacy of Cooperative Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 470–71 (2013) (“It is
well-known that the EPA does not have sufficient resources to effectively implement air quality control
measures in a state; since the 1970s, even legislators and officials have acknowledged that the federal
government probably will never have the resources to unilaterally implement pollution control laws.”).
109. S. REP. NO. 95-127, at 10 (1977).
110. Reitze, Jr., supra note 11, at 11002 (even after the 1990 CAA Amendments, “EPA usually tries to avoid
exercising this authority because the Agency has neither the money nor the staff to adequately develop an FIP
for a major AQCR [Air Quality Control Region], and it is not experienced in dealing with local conditions.”).
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FIPs would not play a major role in air quality regulation until the deficiencies
were overcome or otherwise avoided.
Furthermore, the political shock to EPA from the reaction to the FIPs was
substantial. Even though the Clean Air Act required the agency to adopt the FIPs,
the public and politicians still blamed EPA for it. And Congress reinforced the
political lesson in the 1977 CAA Amendments by repealing two parts of EPA’s
FIP authority: the use of transportation-control measures and indirect sourcecontrol measures.111 The political backlash against these forced FIPs would color
EPA’s attitude toward FIPs for years to come.
In the aftermath of this debacle, states now understood that, while the Clean
Air Act might require EPA to adopt FIPs, the agency desperately wished to avoid
them. Thus, the actual “threat” of a FIP greatly diminished for a state that did not
fulfill its statutory obligations under the Clean Air Act.112 Further, to the extent
that a state might risk being stigmatized as “anti-environmental” by failing to
adopt a plan that would attain the air quality standards,113 the potential economic
and social disruption from the forced FIPs outweighed that risk.
Finally, in response to these forced FIPs, in 1977 Congress amended the Clean
Air Act to extend the deadlines by which states must attain the NAAQS. By doing
so, Congress ensured that the FIP issue would not arise again for a considerable
time.114 In short, the FIP process seemed dead, and the academic literature
thereafter concluded that FIPs did not provide a useful tool in the battle for clean
air.115
2. Resistance Plans
By 1989, EPA had fully institutionalized a culture of resisting large-scale FIPs.
The issue arose again after a federal appeals court rejected EPA’s approval of a
California SIP because EPA could not find that the plan would attain the
NAAQS.116 In the aftermath of EPA’s disapproval of the Southern California SIP,

111. Clean Air Act § 110(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (2014); see Christopher H. Schroeder, Regulating
Automobile Pollution: An Environmental Success Story for Democracy?, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 21, 41
(2001) (“EPA proposed a federal implementation plan (FIP) that utilized drastic gasoline rationing measures
among its strategies . . . . The move proved so unpopular that Congress shortly stripped EPA of the authority to
include TCMs [transportation control measures] as part of a FIP.”).
112. See Thomas O. McGarity, Missing Milestones: a Critical Look at the Clean Air Act’s VOC Emissions
Reduction Program in Nonattainment Areas, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 41, 49 (1999) (“[State officials] correctly
surmised that the probability the EPA would write its own FIP for the states was vanishingly small.”).
113. Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 289 (1999) (“The mere existence of the FIP card provides a strong incentive for states to
avoid both the stigma and the intrusiveness of federal intervention.”).
114. See McNiven, supra note 95, at 1266–67 (discussing deadline extensions in the 1977 CAAAmendments).
115. Daniels, supra note 11, at 1529–33 (describing a FIP as having become “politically taboo”); Reitze, Jr.,
supra note 11, at 11002 (“FIPs have not played a major role in protecting air quality.”).
116. Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1987).
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citizens once again filed suit seeking the implementation of a FIP.117 Suits were
also filed in Arizona.118
EPA responded with a strategy of resisting the FIP process by criticizing it.
EPA was remarkably candid in expressing its objections to FIPs at this point. EPA
warned that a FIP seeking short-term attainment of the air quality standards
“would wreak a level of economic and social disruption that is likely beyond
anything Congress would have imagined would be imposed without some
mitigation.”119 Such a plan would “effectively prevent from operating within the
Basin, in the fifth year, almost all reactive hydrocarbon-based fuel-powered
vehicles; eliminate almost all aircraft and marine vessels from the Basin; [and]
prohibit almost every industrial source from emitting any [volatile organic
compounds] . . . .”120
EPA also complained about its difficulties in implementing FIPs “that require
the compliance of thousands of sources or millions of residents.”121 The FIP
would generate “state and local opposition” rather than “enlist the level of
support that is a prerequisite to successful implementation.”122 Finally, EPA cited
its “limited expertise in the specific approaches that would be used to control
emissions in the Basin.”123
Two years later, when EPA proposed to promulgate a FIP for the South Coast
Air Basin in Southern California,124 EPA continued its vehement protests.125 For
example, it labeled the Clean Air Act “ill-designed to deal with the situation that
besets the South Coast”126 and termed the FIP “anachronistic” in light of ongoing
efforts to amend the CAA.127 At the same time, EPA similarly resisted promulgating a FIP in Arizona.128

117. South Coast 1988 ANPRM, 53 Fed. Reg. at 49,501 (EPA admitted that it had a duty to promulgate a FIP,
and the court entered an order dated Sept. 19, 1988).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 49,512. EPA also noted it would “no doubt encounter great practical difficulties in developing and
implementing such a massive plan.” Id.
120. Id. at 49,512.
121. Id. at 49,516.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 49,518.
124. See generally South Coast 1990 NPRM, 55 Fed. Reg. at 36,458.
125. See Joseph M. Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air Quality Standards, 24 ENVTL. L. 821, 868
(1994) (“EPA . . . shared its woes in a remarkably candid rulemaking.”).
126. South Coast 1990 NPRM, 55 Fed. Reg. at 36,460.
127. Id. EPA also noted that its efforts, in light of the challenge in the South Coast, “may make Hercules’
labors in the Augean Stables seem light like housekeeping.” Id.
128. In McCarthy v. Thomas, No. 85–344 (D. Ariz. Aug. 10, 1987) a court ordered EPA to promulgate a FIP
for carbon monoxide. EPA proposed a FIP for the Phoenix area on May 16, 1988. Approval and Promulgation of
Implementation Plans; Arizona State Implementation Plan Revision, Maricopa and Pima Counties Carbon
Monoxide Plan, 53 Fed. Reg. 17,378 (May 16, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). In subsequent
litigation, the Ninth Circuit vacated approval of the Arizona SIP for the Phoenix nonattainment area and directed
EPA to promulgate a FIP. Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1990). After the 1990 amendments, EPA filed a
motion to recall the mandate in the Delaney case, but the court denied the motion. Subsequently, EPA
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Amid this deluge of resistance, however, certain important features of EPA’s
FIP power began to emerge. First, EPA proposed to supplement the SIPs with
federal programs “such as clean motor vehicle fuels and vehicles and controls on
marine vessel tanks.”129 EPA slowly began to recognize that a FIP could
supplement state efforts at attaining the standards rather than merely replace
those efforts.130
Second, EPA proposed a system of emission fees to help implement parts of
the FIP.131 This proposal suggests EPA’s dawning realization that economic
incentives might provide a mechanism to streamline the federal efforts needed to
implement a FIP. That idea later evolved in other FIPs and proved critical to
EPA’s development of the FIP power.
Finally, Congress once again responded to EPA’s resistance by amending the
Clean Air Act in 1990 to extend the attainment dates.132 But these amendments
did not automatically end the battles over EPA’s duty to promulgate a FIP. After
the amendments, EPA predictably took the position that the 1990 CAA Amendments abrogated any prior duty that the agency had to promulgate a FIP, but the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held otherwise.133
In that litigation, the air quality agency for Southern California surprisingly
supported the FIP’s promulgation. The agency reasoned that attaining clean air in

promulgated FIP contingency procedures. Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Arizona—
Maricopa and Pima Nonattainment Areas; Carbon Monoxide Federal Implementation Plan, 56 Fed. Reg. 5458
(Feb. 11, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). A subsequent round of litigation began in 1994, leading to a
consent decree. A later Ninth Circuit opinion overturned EPA’s approval of the Arizona plan, leading to another
consent decree. Ober v. Whitman, 243 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2001). A number of EPA regulatory documents
discuss the lengthy history of the efforts to force EPA promulgation of FIPs for Arizona. See, e.g., Approval and
Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Arizona—Maricopa County CO Nonattainment Area, 62 Fed. Reg.
63,456 (Dec. 1, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
129. South Coast 1990 NPRM, 55 Fed. Reg. at 36,458.
130. In a later notice of proposed rulemaking for three air basins in California, EPA also stated that it saw the
FIP as supporting local efforts rather than superseding them:
Although EPA is issuing this NPRM today because we are legally required to do so, EPA intends to
use this opportunity to assist renewed state and local efforts to achieve clean, healthy air for the
citizens of California. Therefore, the agency has tried to keep one central principle in mind as we
fashioned our approach: EPA wants to do this in conjunction with the ongoing efforts of the local
communities, not simply impose federal plans upon them.
Sacramento and Ventura Ozone, 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,268.
131. South Coast 1990 NPRM, 55 Fed. Reg. at 36,484; see also Sacramento and Ventura Ozone, 59 Fed.
Reg. at 23,383–84 (discussing use of fees in the FIP).
132. See Hall v. EPA, 273 F.3d 1146, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In general, the 1990 Amendments
contemplated that less serious nonattainment areas would attain NAAQS within five years of enactment and that
more serious nonattainment areas would have 10 years to attain NAAQS. See, e.g., CAA § 172(a)(2)(A), 42
U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2)(A) (setting default five and 10–year attainment deadlines); CAA § 186(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7512(a)(1) (setting 1995 and 2000 deadlines for attainment of carbon monoxide NAAQS); CAA § 188(c), 42
U.S.C. § 7513(c) (setting various attainment dates for areas in moderate and serious nonattainment for PM–10,
with an outside deadline of December 31, 2001, for serious nonattainment areas).”).
133. Coal. for Clean Air v. EPA, 971 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Southern California would require measures that only EPA possessed authority to
adopt under the Clean Air Act, and a FIP would compel EPA to undertake those
measures. When EPA finally released its proposed FIP for Southern California, that FIP
included regulations on sources such as airlines, ocean vessels, and railroads. These are
all measures generally outside the power of states to regulate under the CAA.
Thus, as of 1990, EPA was adamantly opposed to the promulgation of FIPs.
Even after losing the 1990 litigation, EPA ultimately managed to avoid adopting a
FIP for Southern California.134 Nonetheless, the evolution of the FIP process had
begun to reveal the roles a FIP could play in improving air quality.
B.

TARGETED FIPS

1. Interstitial Plans
The 1990 CAA amendments clarified that a FIP was a plan to correct all or a
portion of an inadequacy in a SIP.135 Thus, a FIP could target specific inadequacies in a SIP submitted by a state. A FIP did not necessarily have to consist of the
type of massive intervention needed for areas like Southern California, where
until after 1990 the state-submitted plans came nowhere close to demonstrating
future attainment of the air quality standards.
Reflecting its antipathy toward FIPs, EPA before 1990 had adopted smaller
“gap-filling” or interstitial FIPs only on rare occasions. A principal example was
a FIP regulating sulfur oxide emissions from a large smelter in Nevada.136 After
1990, EPA began to use this type of FIP in instances where it had determined that
a control measure in a SIP did not meet a technological standard mandated by the
Clean Air Act, such as “reasonably available control technology.”137 EPA
gradually became comfortable employing this type of interstitial FIP.
For example, EPA proposed a FIP for taconite plants in Michigan and
Minnesota based on those states’ failures to adopt the statutorily required “best
available retrofit technology” (“BART”) for such plants.138 In doing so, EPA used
the FIP as leverage to incentivize the states to adopt SIPs that would contain more
stringent technological controls. Similarly, EPA adopted a FIP controlling nitrogen oxide emissions from two units of a power-generating station in Nevada.139

134. EPA did publish a proposed 1,700 page FIP for the Los Angeles area. See Sacramento and Ventura
Ozone, 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,264.
135. Clean Air Act § 302(y), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(y) (2014).
136. See Nevada SO2 Control Strategy, 40 Fed. Reg. 5508 (Feb. 6, 1975) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1).
138. Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; States of Michigan and Minnesota;
Regional Haze Implementation Plan; Federal Implementation Plan for Regional Haze, 78 Fed. Reg. 8706 (Feb.
6, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
139. Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Nevada; Regional Haze State and
Federal Implementation Plans; BART Determination for Reid Gardner Generating Station, 77 Fed. Reg. 50936
(Aug. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) [hereinafter Reid Gardner Generating Station].
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Again, EPA “encourage[d] the State to submit a revised SIP to replace all portions
of our FIP.”140 Also falling into this category was EPA’s source-specific FIP for
the so-called “Four Corners” power plant in New Mexico.141 Under EPA’s Tribal
Authority Rule—discussed below in section II.B.2—because the plant is located
on an Indian reservation, the State of New Mexico could not regulate it.142
These interstitial FIPS—relatively few in number and often connected to
EPA’s efforts to combat regional haze—intruded only modestly into the state’s
regulatory domain. The interstitial FIPs involved few EPA resources, since the
agency had already fully analyzed the control measures in the SIP and concluded
that they were insufficient.143 Enforcement of interstitial measures did not greatly
burden EPA, although on occasion those measures posed the specter of dual
implementation where a single source of air pollution would have to comply with
both state and federal requirements for different pollutants.144 Finally, EPA saw
the measures as temporary, repeatedly inviting states to submit SIPs to replace the
FIPs. Nonetheless, the use of interstitial FIPs demonstrates EPA’s increased
comfort both with targeted interference in the state’s autonomy over its air
pollution sources and with the use of FIPs to spur greater state regulation.

140. Id. See also Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Oklahoma; Federal Implementation
Plan for Interstate Transport of Pollution Affecting Visibility and Best Available Retrofit Technology Determinations, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,728 (Dec. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (FIP establishing emissions
limitations based on BART for two units of Oklahoma power plant).
141. Source-Specific Federal Implementation Plan for Four Corners Power Plant; Navajo Nation, 72 Fed.
Reg. 25,698 (May 7, 2007) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 49) (upheld in WildEarth Guardians v. EPA, 759 F.3d
1196 (10th Cir. 2014)).
142. See also Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State of Washington; Regional Haze
State Implementation Plan; Federal Implementation Plan for Best Available Retrofit Technology for Alcoa
Intalco Operations, Tesoro Refining and Marketing, and Alcoa Wenatchee, 79 Fed. Reg. 33,438 (June 11, 2014)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (disapproving state’s BART determination for a refinery and aluminum
facilities and imposing a FIP for the pertinent emission units at these facilities).
143. See Reid Gardner Generating Station, 77 Fed. Reg. at 50,938 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (“EPA
and the states generally consider the same factors in the initial BART determination but may weigh those factors
differently provided the determination in each case is reasonable. BART determinations are case by case
analyses.”).
144. This situation arose most recently when EPA disapproved the Texas SIP for failing to address how it
would regulate GHGs and imposed a FIP. Determinations Concerning Need for Error Correction, Partial
Approval and Partial Disapproval, and Federal Implementation Plan Regarding Texas Prevention of Significant
Deterioration Program; Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,365 (proposed Dec. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 52). EPA responded to criticism regarding dual implementation by pointing out that split authority had
existed previously in both the PSD program and in some nonattainment areas. Action to Ensure Authority to
Issue Permits Under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program to Sources of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions: Federal Implementation Plan, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,246, 82,251 (Dec. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 52). Despite opposing GHG regulation, Texas approved legislation requiring it to develop a state
GHG permitting program, “with broad support from industry interests concerned with the additional requirements and permitting delays associated with the federal program.” Alex Ritchie, Scattered and Dissonant: The
Clean Air Act, Greenhouse Gases, and Implications for the Oil and Gas Industry, 43 ENVTL. L. 461, 480–81
(2013).
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2. Gap Plans
After the 1990 CAA Amendments, EPA gradually expanded use of other types
of FIPs. The expansion originated in EPA’s need to fill larger gaps in the coverage
of state air-pollution control systems. EPA’s initial experience with this broader
type of FIP had accrued earlier when it adopted a regulatory program to prevent
significant deterioration of air quality in areas that had not attained the national
ambient air quality standards.145 A court order had forced EPA to promulgate this
“prevention of significant deterioration” (“PSD”) program.146 However, while
EPA continued to administer the program for states without approved PSD
provisions in their SIPs,147 it remained an idiosyncratic exercise of EPA’s FIP
authority.
In 2006, however, EPA promulgated rules for regulating air quality on Indian
reservations, and these rules constituted a much more significant milestone in the
development of EPA’s authority to fill larger regulatory gaps. Responding to
uncertainty about regulatory jurisdiction over sources of air pollution on Indian
lands, the 1990 CAA Amendments authorized EPA to treat tribes in the same
manner as it treats states.148 The Amendments also required EPA to draft
procedures governing tribal air implementation plans.149 Thus, like states, tribes
could submit implementation plans to EPA for its approval.150
EPA’s so-called “Tribal Authority Rule,”151 which was adopted to comply with
these 1990 amendments, committed EPA to treating tribes in the same manner as
states for most air regulation purposes, with the exception of some statutory
deadlines. Notably, the rules provided that if a tribe did not submit a tribal
implementation plan—the tribal equivalent of a SIP—EPA then may promulgate

145. Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (Dec. 5, 1974) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
146. See, e.g., Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Prevention of Significant Deterioration
(PSD), 68 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (Mar. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). The history of the PSD program
is discussed in Craig N. Oren, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting,
74 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1988).
147. Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD),
68 Fed. Reg. at 11,316 (incorporating newly promulgated paragraphs of the federal PSD rule into the FIP
portion of state implementation plans where states had not previously submitted approved PSD plans).
148. Clean Air Act § 110(o), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(o) (2014) (authorizing tribal implementation plans for all
areas within a tribe’s reservation.).
149. Id. § 7601(d)(2).
150. See, e.g., David F. Coursen, EPA’s New Tribal Strategy, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10643
(2008); Richard G. McAllister & Richard K. Eichstaedt, Federal Implementation of the Clean Air Act in Indian
Country in the Northwest, 46 ADVOCATE 16, 18 (2003); Jana B. Milford, Tribal Authority Under the Clean Air
Act: How Is It Working?, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 213 (2004); Vanessa Baehr-Jones & Christina Cheung, An
Exercise of Sovereignty: Attaining Attainment for Indian Tribes Under the Clean Air Act, 34 ENVIRONS ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y J., 189 (2011).
151. Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254 (Feb. 12, 1998) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 35, 49, 50, 81). See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(rejecting challenges to parts of the rule).
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“without unreasonable delay such Federal implementation plan provisions as are
necessary or appropriate to protect air quality.”152 The agency would act
“pursuant to its ‘gap-filling’ authority under the [CAA] as a whole.”153 The rules
also recognized that tribes could request that EPA adopt a FIP for a tribal
region.154
In 2005, EPA finalized FIPs for air pollution sources on Indian reservations in
Idaho, Oregon, and Washington.155 These plans covered 200,000 people on 39
reservations.156 Unlike the narrow interstitial FIPs,157 these FIPs included a wide
range of measures limiting emissions on various existing stationary sources,
including limits on visible emissions,158 fugitive particulate matter,159 and open
burning.160
EPA’s tribal FIPs originated in a concern for regulatory consistency. The 1990
CAA Amendments put an end to the jurisdictional dispute over regulatory
authority on Indian lands by confirming that states lacked this authority. Accordingly, in adopting the tribal FIPs, EPA explained that the rules “fill a regulatory
gap” and cited “the need to establish requirements in all areas to maintain CAA
standards.”161 The goal was to fill voids in regulatory coverage throughout the
country.
The tribal FIPs initiated a new stage in EPA’s use of FIPs, albeit one forced
upon the agency by a lack of tribal resources or by tribal unwillingness to

152. 40 C.F.R. § 49.11(a). EPA, however, decided not to apply the FIP provisions to Indian country in exactly
the same manner as the states. In particular, the EPA tribal implementation plan regulations do not apply the
2-year deadline to tribes as it applies to states. EPA reasoned: “[T]ribes in general are in the early stages of
developing air planning and implementation expertise. Accordingly, EPA determined that it would be infeasible
and inappropriate to subject tribes to the mandatory submittal deadlines imposed by the Act on states . . . .”
Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7265.
153. 63 Fed. Reg. at 7265.
154. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DEVELOPING A TRIBAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 12 (2002), https://nepis.epa.gov/
Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey⫽00002SIS.TXT.
155. Federal Implementation Plans Under the Clean Air Act for Indian Reservations in Idaho, Oregon and
Washington, 70 Fed. Reg. 18,074 (Apr. 8, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 and 49) [hereinafter FIPs for
Indian Reservations] (upheld in Safe Air for Everyone v. EPA, 2006 WL 3697684 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2006)). EPA
also had issued a guidance on Direct Implementation of Tribal Cooperative Agreements. Notice of Guidance
Issuance: Direct Implementation Tribal Cooperative Agreements (DITCAs) Guidance, 70 Fed. Reg. 1440 (Jan.
7, 2005).
156. See McAllister & Eichstaedt, supra note 150, at 16.
157. Before these more comprehensive FIPs, EPA had issued narrow, interstitial FIPs that addressed air
pollution concerns at specific facilities located in Indian country. See Federal Implementation Plan for Tri-Cities
Landfill, Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, 64 Fed. Reg. 65,660 (Nov. 23, 1999) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pts. 49 and 52); Federal Implementation Plan for the Astaris-Idaho LLC Facility in the Fort Hall
PM10 Nonattainment Area, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,412 (Aug. 23, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 49).
158. 40 C.F.R. § 49.124.
159. Id. § 49.126.
160. Id. § 49.131.
161. FIPs for Indian Reservations, 70 Fed. Reg. at 18,076.
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complete planning efforts for air quality.162 But while some individual tribal FIPs
were quite broad in scope, they were not ground-breaking, instead employing air
quality control measures found in other SIPs.163 The tribal plans also regulated
relatively few sources of air pollution, and EPA was able to use similar control
measures in all of the tribal FIPs, thus minimizing EPA’s administrative burden.164
In short, while the tribal FIPs were broader in scope, the measures in them
were not innovative. At the same time, adopting these FIPs forced EPA to
consider the source of its authority for the specific requirements included in
them,165 and thus to evaluate the scope of its legal authority in promulgating FIPs
more generally. It also gave the agency additional experience in implementing
FIPs after the plans’ adoption.
In 2011, EPA issued a FIP adopting two extensive rules governing new sources
in tribal areas,166 thereby extending the agency’s authority over additional
sources of air pollution that tribes had not previously regulated.167 Once again,
the agency was largely able to accomplish its goal by incorporating control
measures already included in existing SIPs.168

162. EPA’s regulations allow a tribe, instead of creating its own plan, to request that EPA adopt a FIP that
regulates air pollution sources on a reservation. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 154, at 12.
163. FIPs for Indian Reservations, 70 Fed. Reg. at 18,074:
The gap-filling rules EPA proposed in March 2002 were generally based upon the aspects of
neighboring State and local rules most relevant to the air polluting activities on reservations in the
Pacific Northwest, and follow a level of control of a typical air quality control program. EPA does not
intend, nor does it expect, these gap-filling regulations to impose significantly different regulatory
burdens upon industry or residents within reservations than those imposed by the rules of State and
local air agencies in the surrounding areas.
Id. For example, the FIP regulated visible emissions, particulate matter, sulfur in fuels, and open burning. 40
C.F.R. §§ 49.124, 49.125, 49.130, and 49.131.
164. See FIPs for Indian Reservations, 70 Fed. Reg. at 18,086 (“As described above, EPA is developing an
Implementation Framework to guide how EPA and the affected Tribes will implement the rules on each
reservation. To the extent practicable, these regulations minimize the implementation burdens upon EPA and the
regulated community while establishing requirements that are unambiguous and enforceable.”).
165. EPA explained that the FIPs “also can rely on other authorities in the CAA to regulate and obtain
information about sources of pollutants other than NAAQS, such as our authority to require reporting and
recording keeping under section 114 of the CAA.” FIPs for Indian Reservations, 70 Fed. Reg. at 18,078.
166. Review of New Sources and Modifications in Indian Country, 76 Fed. Reg. 38,748 (July 1, 2011) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 49 and 51). EPA previously regulated new sources in Indian country in attainment
areas through the PSD program. Id. at 38,753 (“EPA has been implementing a FIP for major sources in
attainment areas and has been issuing PSD permits in Indian country.”). However, in Oklahoma Dept. of
Environmental Quality v. EPA, 740 F.3d 185 (D.C. Cir. 2014), the court held that EPA had no jurisdiction to
issue a FIP for non-reservation Indian country lands unless the tribe had demonstrated that it had jurisdiction
over such lands.
167. See Robert Gruenig, EPA’s New Air Rules Mean Monumental Changes for Emissions in Indian Country,
43 ABA TRENDS, no. 6, July/Aug. 2012, at 4. (“The rules mean monumental changes to how facilities in Indian
country must operate in the future.”)
168. Id. (“Facilities affected by the two new rules will be required to follow an NSR [New Source Review]
program process similar to the one in place for non-tribal lands.”).
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3. Agreement Plans
As EPA increased the use of its FIP authority, states began to identify
advantages that could accrue to them from FIPs in specific instances. A loss of
state control would occur, but countervailing considerations existed. For example, resource constraints might make it difficult for smaller states to complete
certain parts of the full SIP process, and a FIP meant that EPA, rather than the
states, would largely do the work.
Thus, in a relatively low number of situations involving smaller states, EPA
promulgated FIPs with some degree of agreement from the particular states
affected.169 For example, before EPA promulgated a FIP for Hawaii to address
regional haze, it first obtained a measure of agreement from that state. The
rulemaking emphasized that EPA had “worked closely with the State of Hawaii in
the development of this plan”170 and that the state “has agreed to incorporate the
control requirements into the relevant permits.”171 Similarly, EPA later promulgated FIPs for states that refused to submit corrective SIP revisions that included
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions in their PSD programs. The agency noted
that each of the seven states affected by the rulemaking had at least partially
agreed to EPA’s action, “specifically indicat[ing] to EPA that it preferred that EPA
promulgate a FIP to take effect by January 2, 2011.”172 While these states did not
accept the idea of GHG regulation, they wanted to ensure that a complete permit
program was in place by the date when sources in the state became subject to
PSD provisions applying to GHG emissions.
These “agreement” FIPs, though few in number, highlight a larger issue: If
EPA promulgates a FIP for a state, is that state obligated to implement the FIP
through its permit system and to enforce the FIP when violations occur? During
the initial years of FIP development, EPA assumed that once it put the FIP into
169. An antecedent of these agreement plans was the parking provision in the Massachusetts SIP. EPA had
initially developed a parking freeze at Logan International Airport as part of its FIP for the Boston Region in
1975. In its 1979 and 1982 SIPs, Massachusetts incorporated the FIP’s parking freeze provisions by reference,
thereby committing the state to implement and enforce it “as a state regulation as well as a Federal law.”
Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Massachusetts; Amendment to the Massachusetts Port Authority/Logan Airport Parking Freeze and City of Boston/East Boston Parking Freeze, 65 Fed. Reg.
70,676 (Nov. 27, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
170. Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State of Hawaii; Regional Haze Federal
Implementation Plan, 77 Fed. Reg. 61,478 (Oct. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). The Hawaii
Department of Health did not comment on the draft rule. Id. at 61,479.
171. Id. at 61,478. See also Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation; Plans; United States
Virgin Islands; Regional Haze Federal Implementation Plan, 77 Fed. Reg. 64,414 (Oct. 22, 2012) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (“The Virgin Islands Department of Planning and Natural Resources has indicated that the
Government of the Virgin Islands agrees with EPA’s moving forward to prepare this FIP.”).
172. Action to Ensure Authority to Issue Permits Under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program
to Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Federal Implementation Plan, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,246, 82,248 (Dec. 30,
2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). EPA also stated that it was immediately promulgating FIPs to avoid
situations where larger sources might be obligated to obtain PSD permits for greenhouse gases but no permitting
authority was authorized to issue those permits. Id. at 82,249.
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place, the state would administer its provisions. However, as the Supreme Court
issued a series of decisions expanding the constraints imposed by the Tenth
Amendment, EPA recognized that it could no longer automatically rely upon state
administrative mechanisms to implement FIPs.173 This limitation meant that EPA
would find it more difficult to use FIPs even as the agency’s attitude warmed over
the years toward the usefulness of its FIP power.
Consequently, in some instances, the agency sought agreement from states to
voluntarily implement their FIPs. EPA decided that it had authority to delegate
implementation and enforcement of a FIP if EPA found that the state had the legal
enforcement authority under state law and had committed the necessary staff and
resources. EPA first instituted this practice in implementing PSD programs174 and
later adopted a similar policy that allowed Indian tribes subject to FIPs to assist in
implementing those plans.175
These developments marked an important step in the evolution of EPA’s
thinking about FIPs. EPA recognized that FIPs such as those for PSD areas were
likely to remain in place for lengthy periods of time. In some instances, states
either did not have the resources needed to reclaim their authority from EPA
through a SIP submittal or were simply content to let EPA regulate. Given these
state attitudes, EPA had to consider the effect of FIP implementation on EPA’s
own resources.
Adopting a FIP was onerous for EPA, but assuming the agency was not in
“avoidance” mode, its expertise equipped it to decide the actual emission controls
for sources. The agency possessed considerable technical expertise that it could
bring to bear on this specific task, for it constantly undertook reviews of control
measures in deciding whether to approve SIPs, and it also evaluated technology
in issuing performance standards for new sources of air pollution. However, EPA
was less capable of day-to-day implementation and enforcement of a permit
system, an area in which states had considerable expertise and had a continuing

173. See supra section I.D.1.
174. 42 C.F.R. §52.21(u)(1) (“The Administrator shall have the authority to delegate his responsibility for
conducting source review pursuant to this section . . . .”); Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans;
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD), 68 Fed. Reg. 11,315, 11,318 (Mar. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 52) (“As of December 31, 2002, a number of State and local agencies did not have approved PSD
programs in their SIPs . . . . In most of those jurisdictions, the State or local agency administers the federal PSD
program pursuant to a delegation of authority under § 52.21 (u).”).
175. Notice of Guidance Issuance: Direct Implementation Tribal Cooperative Agreements (DITCAs)
Guidance, 70 Fed. Reg. 1440 (Jan. 7, 2005):
EPA believes that the DITCA authority makes available an important tool for tribes who wish to work
with EPA in the implementation of environmental programs in Indian country by allowing tribes to be
involved in assisting EPA as EPA implements federal programs for tribes. DITCAs are intended to
provide a method to accomplish program implementation that is in addition to the Federal delegation
of authority method, also referred to as the “treatment in a manner similar to states” or “TAS”
approach to implementation.
Id.

2016]

FEDERAL IMPLEMENTATION PLANS

667

interest in administering. Accordingly, an agreement delegating FIP enforcement
to the state accommodated the primary expertise and interests of both EPA and
the state.
C.

AFFIRMATIVE FIPS

1. Partnership Plans
In 1988, EPA slowly began to recognize that a judicious use of the FIP power
could play a significant role in improving air quality. Thus, in that year EPA
published an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking for a California FIP that
tentatively began to explore a new role for FIPs. The notice declared that “EPA
could promulgate in the FIP, at least in theory, other types of federal initiatives
that might expedite emission reduction progress . . . .”176 The FIP “would supplement the existing and proposed state and local measures.”177 EPA solicited
comment on various measures that exceeded state authority, such as lower
emission standards for aircraft engines and tighter controls on emissions from
petroleum exploration and development on the Outer Continental Shelf.178
By 1994, when EPA issued a notice of rulemaking for yet another Southern
California FIP, its attitude toward the FIP had changed. The agency now declared
that its goals in promulgating the FIP “compel EPA to go beyond normal
boundaries of rule development and implementation.”179 It characterized the FIP
in a positive light as presenting an opportunity “to assist renewed state and local
efforts”180 that could “make real progress towards clean air on a variety of
fronts.”181 And it saw its role in promulgating a FIP as “moving beyond the mere
fulfillment of our legal responsibilities toward the establishment of a full working
partnership among all parties.”182
While EPA still repeated its hope that the FIPs “will become obsolete as a
regulatory matter,”183 the era of “evasion” FIPs had receded for several reasons.
First, the implementation of SIPs was nearing the twenty-year mark. EPA
recognized that states had seriously attempted to adopt SIPs that would meet the
air quality standards, and those efforts had resulted in substantial progress in
improving air quality. Nonetheless, state efforts alone were unlikely to successfully meet the air quality standards in heavily polluted areas.

176. South Coast 1988 ANPRM, 53 Fed. Reg. at 49,515.
177. Id. at 49,516.
178. Id. The notice went on to discuss a variety of other measures that strengthened existing controls already
in the state plan, such as an enhanced motor vehicle inspection and maintenance program. Id. at 49,517.
179. Sacramento and Ventura Ozone, 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,269.
180. Id. at 23,268.
181. Id. at 23,269.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 23,270.
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Second, EPA now viewed the FIP as a supplementary regulatory device rather
than as a total replacement for a SIP. An EPA FIP could regulate pollution sources
that a state could not, and EPA could adopt measures that complemented what
states were doing. Thus, a FIP rulemaking for Southern California proposed
controls for sources like airports, locomotives, ships, and ports—sources largely
outside the reach of states under the Clean Air Act.184
EPA’s warming attitude toward FIPs, however, required the agency to confront
new issues. Some of those were administrative in nature: EPA proposed to
regulate area sources, which are non-discrete sources of pollution such as
architectural coatings or emissions from pesticide use.185 In contrast to regulation
of discrete stationary sources, regulation of these types of mobile consumer
products affected larger markets. Consumer products from outside the regulated
jurisdiction, which are subject to less-stringent emission controls, could be used
inside the regulated jurisdiction. For example, consumers might buy paints from
outside of a nonattainment area and then bring them in for use. In response, EPA
proposed to regulate these types of consumer products on a statewide basis rather
than just in the nonattainment area.186
A more significant problem posed by the expanded use of FIPs was how EPA
would allocate emissions reductions among the various sources. A FIP necessarily required further reductions from sources beyond those secured by readily
available control technology. In its 1990 SIP for the South Coast Air Basin, EPA
had proposed the use of market-based incentives as control measures. Its initial
rationale at that time was defensive: these measures “will be especially important
to mitigate the harshness of the measures that EPA has no choice but to
impose.”187 EPA later began to view market-based measures positively, proposing a cap on sources requiring annual reductions in emissions of between 4 and 9
percent.188 EPA sought comment on whether a trading component “should be
added to increase compliance options.”189

184. Id. at 23,264 (“The proposed FIP includes innovative control programs to reduce emissions associated
with airports and, particularly within the South Coast, emissions from locomotives, ships, and ports.”).
185. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA’S REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT (ROE)—GLOSSARY, https://cfpub.epa.
gov/roe/glossary.cfm (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (“Area sources can include vehicles and other small engines,
small businesses and household activities, or biogenic sources such as a forest that releases hydrocarbons.”).
186. Sacramento and Ventura Ozone, 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,316. The problem was one of source mobility:
If, for example, the architectural coating rule applied only in the narrow FIP areas, house painters in
southern Sutter County (part of the nonattainment area) might drive to northern Sutter (outside the
nonattainment area) to purchase cheaper paints, or lemon growers in Ventura might cross into Santa
Barbara for a pesticide formulation they had used the year before.
Id. The agency proposed to solve the mobility problem by regulating on a statewide basis. Id.
187. South Coast 1990 NPRM, 55 Fed. Reg. at 36,461.
188. Sacramento and Ventura Ozone, 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,274.
189. Id.

2016]

FEDERAL IMPLEMENTATION PLANS

669

This proposal marked a turning point in the development of FIPs. Market
incentive programs create additional pathways for compliance by the regulated
sources, and such programs are easier for EPA to implement.190 The agency no
longer focuses narrowly on whether individual sources are meeting a specific
emission limitation. Instead, the agency totals the emissions from a particular
facility and then ensures that the facility has sufficient credits to cover those
emissions. The use of market systems promised to lighten the resource demands
on EPA in implementing and enforcing FIPs, a vitally important consideration in
the agency’s attitude toward them.
2. Hybrid Plans
The most important milestone in this evolution of EPA’s FIP authority was the
agency’s program to control sulfur dioxide (“SO2”) emissions causing acid
rain.191 Title IV of the 1990 CAA Amendments192 required EPA to adopt a
multi-state approach that controlled SO2 emissions from power plants. The
program was unique at the time in that it instituted a market-based cap-and-trade
program. Under the program’s first phase, implemented in 1995, EPA set a
nationwide cap on SO2 emissions of 9.5 million tons per year.193 A second phase,
which took effect in 2000, targeted large coal-burning power plants and established a final annual emissions cap of 8.95 million tons.194 Ultimately, the plan
limited total SO2 releases from power plants to about 50% of the levels emitted in
1980.195
EPA proclaimed the program successful, estimating that it reduced annual
emissions of SO2 from 17.3 million tons to 10.2 million tons, and that nitrogen
oxide and mercury emissions also were reduced significantly.196 But the program
had also affected EPA’s attitude toward its FIP authority, as EPA gained signifi190. Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039,
2093–94 (1993) (“[T]ransferable pollution permits require each source to hold permits corresponding to the
amount of pollution that it emits . . . . Accordingly, the ultimate allocation of pollution rights, and hence of
pollution control, among sources is determined by the market, rather than by government regulation.”).
191. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & ECON. 37, 38 (1998); Joseph Goffman, Title IV of the Clean
Air Act: Lessons for Success of the Acid Rain Emissions Trading Program, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 177,
178–79 (2006).
192. Clean Air Act § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2014).
193. Air and Noise Pollution Abatement Services: An Examination of U.S. and Foreign Markets, Inv. No.
332-461, USITC Pub. 3761, 5-4 (Apr. 2005), https://usitc.gov/publications/docs/pubs/332/pub3761.pdf; Clean
Air Markets: Acid Rain Program—SO2 Reductions, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/acidrain-program (last updated June 16, 2016).
194. USITC Pub. 3761, supra note 193, at 5-4; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 193.
195. Clean Air Markets: Acid Rain Program—Overview, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
airmarkets/acid-rain-program (last updated June 16, 2016).
196. Acid Rain and Related Programs: 2009 Emission, Compliance, and Market Analyses, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY (Sept. 2010), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/arp_2009_ecm_analyses.
pdf.
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cant experience in administering a multi-state cap-and-trade program. The
agency learned that the administrative resources needed for the program were
significantly smaller than resources needed to implement FIPs with “commandand-control” features imposing technology-based controls on individual sources.
EPA put this knowledge to use. In 2006, EPA responded to a petition filed by
North Carolina under section 126 of the Clean Air Act, which addresses
emissions from states that affect the ability of other, downwind states to achieve
the NAAQS.197 EPA’s response, the so-called “Clean Air Interstate Rule”
(“CAIR”), originally called upon states to implement reductions through their
SIPs.198 Later, however, the agency imposed a FIP to give states additional
compliance options,199 and EPA based the FIP on the acid rain trading program.200
The FIP instituted three separate cap-and-trade programs covering SO2 and
nitrogen oxide (“NOX”) emissions from electric utilities.201 Notably, EPA designed the FIP to offer states a range of options.202 States could accept the FIP and
allow EPA to administer the cap-and-trade programs or adopt model SO2 and
NOX trading programs provided by EPA for EGUs.203

197. 42 U.S.C. § 7426.
198. Rule To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule);
Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions to the NOX SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78 and 96). This rule determined that 28 states and the District of
Columbia contribute significantly to nonattainment of the national ambient air quality standards for NOX, SO2,
one type of particulate matter (PM2.5), and the 8-hour standard for ozone in downwind states. Id. EPA stated
that it “intends the CAIR FIPs to address the requirements of section 110(a)(2)(D)(i) to prevent interstate
transport that contributes significantly to nonattainment or interferes with maintenance in downwind areas and
to provide a Federal backstop for CAIR.” Id.
199. Rulemaking on Section 126 Petition From North Carolina to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine
Particulate Matter and Ozone; Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone; Revisions to the Clean Air Interstate Rule; Revisions to the Acid Rain Program, 71 Fed. Reg.
25,328, 25,330 (Apr. 28, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 73, 74, 78, 96, and 97) [hereinafter
Section 126 Petition]. EPA stated: “EPA is denying the petition because, concurrently with the section 126
response, EPA is promulgating FIPs that require elimination of the significant contribution [to nonattainment].”
The rulemaking also discusses the complex procedural history that preceded EPA’s adoption of the FIP. Id. at
25,332–33.
200. The CAIR FIP implemented its cap-and-trade program by changing the value of SO2 allowances under
the Acid Rain Program. Federal Plan Issued to Implement the Clean Air Interstate Rule, 16 AIR POLLUTION
CONSULTANT 4.1 (2006).
201. In earlier action in response to the Section 126 Petition, EPA had also instituted a trading scheme across
the entire region as a remedy under section 126. Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking on
Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,292, 56,309 (Oct.
21, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52 and 97); see also Findings of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 64 Fed. Reg.
28,250, 28,307 (May 25, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (discussing trading as a section 126 remedy).
202. Section 126 Petition, 71 Fed. Reg. at 25,330 (“The EPA is providing FIP approaches that are flexible
and intended to provide States options for getting their SIPs in place.”).
203. Id. at 25,339 (“States planning to adopt the model trading programs contained in the CAIR rule, can
accept the FIP and significantly reduce the State resources needed to establish a program to implement the
CAIR.”).
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Another alternative was that states could submit what EPA termed “abbreviated SIPs” under which states could take over some individual aspects of the FIP
program.204 The abbreviated SIPs would automatically replace the corresponding
sections of the FIP imposed upon that state.205 For example, a state could seek
EPA approval to administer the distribution of pollutant allowances under the
program’s overall cap or “emission budget,” rather than accepting the allowance
methodology in EPA’s rules.206 Indeed, EPA expressed its preference that states
do so.207 States also could opt to expand the program by including other
industrial sources in it.208
CAIR envisioned a kind of “hybrid” FIP. This type of FIP assumed a
long-term, synergistic interaction between the FIP and state programs, rather than
a unilateral federal takeover. For example, EPA’s rulemaking addressed the
interaction between the trading program in the EPA-administered CAIR FIP and
state trading programs that met the requirements of CAIR.209 Consistency
between the CAIR programs administered by states and those administered by

204. Id.:
The EPA is finalizing . . . the approach that a State can choose to modify the application of the CAIR
FIP through abbreviated SIP revisions. The abbreviated SIP revisions approach covers specific
elements of the FIP trading programs without submitting full SIP revisions to meet the requirements
of CAIR. By accepting such abbreviated SIP revisions, EPA is providing additional options for States
to comply with CAIR. A State can choose to retain control of these specific elements of the trading
programs, without submitting a full SIP revision to meet the requirements of CAIR. As there are no
sanctions associated with the FIP, EPA anticipates that some States will prefer to avoid spending the
time and money necessary to submit a full SIP revision.
Id.
205. EPA stated that it would accept abbreviated SIP revisions for any of the following elements of a FIP
trading program:
(1) Provisions for otherwise unaffected units to opt-in to the FIP trading programs, (2) allocating
annual and/or ozone season NOX, (3) allocating allowances from the annual NOX Compliance
Supplement Pool (CSP), and (4) including NOX SIP Call trading sources that are not EGUs under
CAIR in the Federal CAIR ozone season NOX cap-and-trade program.
Id.
206. Id. (“In offering a framework for abbreviated SIP revisions, the Agency anticipates that many States
will wish to retain control over the allocation of allowances.”); see, e.g., Approval and Promulgation of Air
Quality Implementation Plans; West Virginia; Clean Air Interstate Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 52,289 (Sept. 13, 2007)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52 and 97) (approving West Virginia’s methodology for allocating NOX
allowances for the NOX annual and NOX ozone season trading programs put in place by the Clean Air Interstate
Rule FIPs).
207. Section 126 Petition, 71 Fed. Reg. at 25,352 (“The Agency’s preference is for States to make decisions
about NOX allocations for their sources.”).
208. Id. at 25,339 (EPA will accept abbreviated SIP revisions that include “[p]rovisions for otherwise
unaffected units to opt-in to the FIP trading programs.”).
209. Id. at 25,328 (“Today’s action also revises CAIR SIP model trading rules in order to address the
interaction between the EPA-administered CAIR FIP trading programs being promulgated today and the
EPA-administered CAIR State trading programs that will be created by any State that elects to submit a SIP
establishing such a trading program to meet the requirements of the CAIR.”).
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EPA for states would benefit individual sources in both types of states.210
Accordingly, the CAIR FIP incentivized states to adopt trading programs whose
features were consistent with those in EPA’s FIP.
To provide that incentive, EPA adopted the FIP early in the two-year period
during which the Clean Air Act required EPA to adopt it.211 Adopting the FIP
early gave EPA the opportunity to influence the contents of SIPs while simultaneously respecting parochial state preferences, thereby encouraging innovation and
adaptation to local conditions. At the same time, EPA’s ability to incentivize
states meant that EPA possessed considerable discretion to design the FIP in a
way that would further its own policy goals.
EPA’s FIP also emphasized the importance of the data that the agency had
compiled on both air-pollution transport and the cost of control mechanisms.
Without that data, declared EPA, states “would face great difficulties in developing transport SIPs” to meet the interstate transport requirements of section
110(a)(2)(D) of the CAA.212 The emphasis on EPA’s data-collection role supported EPA’s new approach to affirmative FIPs. EPA now recognized an additional role that the FIP process could play in helping states meet the NAAQS.213
Additionally, EPA’s CAIR FIP capitalized on the appeal of a trading system to
operators of large EGUs subject to the rule. If so allowed, of course, those sources
would have opted for no new rule at all. But if EPA was going to impose new
controls, these sources much preferred a trading regime to command-and-control
regulations.214 Further, the interstate nature of the trading program promised
additional opportunities to reduce costs. In short, the political dynamics of the
sources’ response to the FIP at this point differed dramatically from the response
of sources to the evasion FIPs of the early 1970s.
Finally, EPA’s new strategic use of its FIP authority moved implementation of
the Clean Air Act out of its narrow focus on intra-state compliance by imposing
FIPs with identical trading systems in twenty-eight states and incentivizing states
to accept that system.215 Two benefits of this change also were particularly

210. Id. at 25,330 (“The CAIR FIP trading programs are integrated with the EPA-administered State CAIR
trading programs that are based on the model rules so that sources can trade with one another under the
respective emissions caps.”).
211. Id. at 25,339 (“[H]aving the FIP in place early provides for a transition to a CAIR trading program with
the greatest continuity, administrative ease, and cost savings for States . . . .”).
212. Id.
213. EPA followed the same pattern five years later for the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, promulgating
FIPs that implemented cap-and-trade programs for 27 states. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport
of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97) [hereinafter Transport Rule FIPs].
214. EPA emphasized the support for the trading regime: “The great majority of public comments supported
the preferred trading remedy. Most of these commenters voiced their support for the broadest possible trading
mechanism because it allows the most cost-effective implementation of any emission controls.” Id. at 48,272.
215. The incentives in the EPA FIP proved attractive. In 2008, EPA withdrew the CAIR FIPs for twelve states
that submitted full SIPs meeting the CAIR requirements by participating in EPA’s trading programs. Withdrawal
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important: administrative efficiency in EPA’s implementation of the program, and
greater compliance-cost savings as the cap-and-trade market expanded.216
3. Melded Plans
As EPA gained confidence in using FIPs as an affirmative tool to improve air
quality, the agency was forced to consider the consequences of imposing multiple
FIPs containing trading programs that governed separate pollutants but applied to
an overlapping set of states and sources. The possibility existed of inconsistent
federal requirements, an outcome that could easily generate considerable opposition to FIPs. At the same time, however, overlapping FIPs offered the promise of
increased efficiency in pollution reduction. If the FIPs established trading
markets that were compatible rather than conflicting, those markets would afford
sources enhanced flexibility in fashioning responses. Sources could choose an
optimal mix of pollution controls and selling or buying pollution trading rights.
Ultimately, EPA determined that it could meld the features of FIPs imposed for
pollutants in different trading programs. EPA’s 2006 CAIR finalized three
separate cap-and-trade programs: SO2 annual, NOX annual, and NOX ozone
season.217 EPA stated that the integration of the cap-and-trade programs “means
that these trading programs will work together to create effectively a single
trading program for each regulated pollutant.”218 It argued that “integration of the
trading programs reduces the possibility of inconsistent or conflicting deadlines
or requirements, increases the potential cost savings for sources, and streamlines
program administration.”219 The incentives provided by region-wide cap and
trade programs, declared EPA, “encourage economically efficient compliance

of Federal Implementation Plans for the Clean Air Interstate Rule in 12 States, 73 Fed. Reg. 22,818, 22,820
(Apr. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). However, in July 2008, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit vacated the rule. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008), modified on reh’g,
550 F.3d 1176. (D.C. Cir. 2008). The court granted EPA’s petition to remand the case without vacating the
CAIR, thus leaving the CAIR and the related FIP in place while EPA remedied the legal problems. North
Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d at 1178. Thereafter, requirements remained in place while EPA developed the
so-called “Transport Rule.” See Transport Rule FIPs, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,208.
216. Section 126 Petition, 71 Fed. Reg. at 25,344:
Sources subject to trading programs under the FIP and sources in States choosing to participate in the
EPA-administered CAIR SIP trading programs will be able to trade allowances with one another
under common emissions caps across participating States. Integration of the trading programs reduces
the possibility of inconsistent or conflicting deadlines or requirements, increases the potential cost
savings for sources, and streamlines program administration. Unnecessary inconsistency in trading
programs could hamper sources’ ability to plan and achieve the needed reductions as cost effectively
as possible.
Id.
217. Id. at 25,343.
218. Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; West Virginia; Clean Air Interstate
Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 52,289, 52,290 (Sept. 13, 2007) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52 and 97).
219. Section 126 Petition, 71 Fed. Reg. at 25,344.
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over the entire region.”220
Similarly, when EPA proposed a FIP in 2006 to implement mercury standards
of performance for steam-fired EGUs that use coal, the agency again addressed
how this FIP would meld with other previously imposed FIPs. It noted, “[an]
added benefit of the cap-and-trade approach is that it dovetails well with the
sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOX) emission caps under CAIR.”221
4. Preclusive Plans
EPA’s initial reluctance to implement FIPs meant that it would adopt a FIP only
if compelled by court order. As FIPs became more common, the agency
regularized its procedures for issuing them. It would often adopt formal findings
disapproving parts of SIPs. The findings would inform the state that the
disapproval triggered a two-year “clock” for EPA to promulgate a FIP under the
1990 CAA Amendments, and that promulgation would occur unless the state
resolved its plan deficiency during this period.222 The two-year clock afforded
states a significant amount of time in which to correct the SIP deficiency and
signaled EPA’s recognition that states could not be expected to immediately
comply with complex federal mandates.223
In its recent FIP rulemaking on the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (“CSAPR”
or “Transport Rule”)—which is the CAIR-replacement rule—EPA altered its
approach.224 The agency began issuing FIPs much earlier in the two-year period,

220. Id. at 25,341.
221. Revisions of Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources; Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units; Federal Plan Requirements for Clean Air Mercury Rule; and Revisions of Acid Rain Program
Rules, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,100, 77,105 (proposed Dec. 22, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 62, 72, and
78).
222. See, e.g., Finding of Failure to Submit a Revised State Implementation Plan (SIP) for Lead; Missouri;
Doe Run-Herculaneum Lead Nonattainment Area, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,767, 40,767 (July 28, 1999) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (“The failure-to-submit finding triggers the 18-month time clock for the mandatory
application of sanctions and a 2-year time clock for a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) under the Clean Air
Act (CAA).”); Finding of Failure To Submit a Required State Implementation Plan Revision for 1-Hour Ozone
Standard, California—San Joaquin Valley—Reasonably Available Control Technology, 74 Fed. Reg. 3442,
3443 (Jan. 21, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (“CAA section 110(c)(1) provides that EPA must
promulgate a federal implementation plan addressing the 1-hour ozone RACT requirements in the SJV no later
than 2 years after today’s finding unless we approve the State’s RACT submittal within that time.”). Typically,
such notices would also inform the state of the timetable for the imposition of other sanctions under the CAA,
such as a cutoff in highway funding. Id.
223. See Babich, supra note 13, at 32 (“It would be unrealistic . . . to expect sovereigns to instantaneously
enact or promulgate needed legislative or regulatory changes to keep pace with federal programs. After all,
states do not have a clear target for needed changes until revisions to the federal programs are final. And state
legislative and administrative processes—like federal processes—take time.”).
224. Ryland Li, Case Comment, EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.: Agencies Can Consider Costs in
the Face of Statutory Silence, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 308 (2015) (“[T]he Agency’s new policy—of
issuing the FIPs contemporaneously with quantifying [Good Neighbor Provision (GNP)] obligations in the
Transport Rule—was a departure from its prior policies in the NOX SIP Call and CAIR, where the Agency had
given states an opportunity to submit SIPs after it quantified GNP obligations.”).
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giving states far less time to correct the problems and submit a reformulated
SIP.225 EPA cited a need for uniformity as justifying this change in position. In a
situation where the Clean Air Act required multiple states to comply with a
requirement by a single deadline, delaying FIPs for noncomplying states would
unfairly disadvantage sources in those states that had already submitted complying SIPs.226 Sources in the complying states would have to act earlier to meet the
SIP’s emissions standards than sources in the recalcitrant states. This situation
competitively penalized sources in states that affirmatively complied with the
Act’s mandate.
EPA also justified the change on public health grounds, observing that delaying
a FIP proposal meant delaying reductions in pollution and therefore “unnecessarily jeopardiz[ing] public health.”227 That position, of course, starkly contrasts
with EPA’s view at the time of the evasion FIPs in which the agency repeatedly
resisted adopting FIPs for the most polluted areas of the country.228 The agency’s
attitude had, indeed, changed over time.
III. THE MODIFIED FEDERALISM

OF

AIR PLANNING

As the discussion in Part II of this Article has shown, EPA has now gained
substantial experience with FIPs, and its view of them has evolved considerably.
As part of that process, EPA’s use of FIPs modified the relationship between
states and the federal government in air quality regulation. This change embodies
six important features. Three of them involve shifts in regulatory authority or
activity, while the other three concern the use of incentives.
A.

SHIFTING THE REGULATORY CENTER

1. The Subordination of Political Geography
First, in using FIPs, EPA has moved the focus of regulatory efforts for
controlling some important pollutants from state-based regulation to airshed225. States challenged this provision in the Transport Rule, arguing that because the provision of the CAA in
question—the so-called “good neighbor” provision—did not present a clear numerical target, EPA was required
to give states time to comply before implementing a FIP. A majority of the panel in the District of Columbia
Circuit agreed, declaring that the Transport Rule represented an impermissible “FIP-first” approach. EME
Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). The
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the plain meaning of section 110 authorized EPA to impose the FIP
immediately. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1601. The Court also reasoned that where Congress intended for EPA
action to be a prerequisite for states to act, it expressly stated such a requirement. Id.
226. Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce the Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,394, 56,399
(proposed Oct. 21, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 40 and 98) (“Under a delayed FIP proposal approach,
industry in the non-complying States might experience an unfair competitive advantage over industry in States
which elected to reduce their NOX emissions and reduce interstate transport of ozone and ozone precursors in an
earlier timeframe . . . .”).
227. Id.
228. See supra section II.A.2.
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based regulation. The 1970 CAA Amendments required EPA to set ambient air
quality standards but relied on state efforts to implement those standards.229 As
the Supreme Court put it, Congress was “taking a stick” to the states230 by
requiring them to adopt SIPs that would attain the air quality standards. The Act
emphasized a state’s wide discretion in designing the mix of emission limitations
that suited it, and EPA merely played a backup role in the event that states failed
in their responsibilities.231
State-based regulation, however, conflicted with the interstate nature of some
air pollution, particularly ozone transport in the East and formation of regional
haze in the West. While the Act contained provisions addressing interstate air
pollution,232 those provisions initially proved relatively ineffectual.233 States
demonstrated little enthusiasm for bearing the economic costs of controlling
sources in their states to benefit the air quality in other states.
EPA ultimately responded to this situation by recognizing that interstate
pollution required federal regulation or, at a minimum, an enlarged federal
framework for regulation.234 EPA implemented its new viewpoint through its
regulation of acid rain and then through a series of FIPs addressing interstate
transport of ozone and other pollutants. It became increasingly evident from this
evolution that the original state-centric approach of FIPs was unrealistic in
important ways. EPA’s recognition of the multi-state nature of air pollution
ultimately forced the agency to respond by sponsoring an interstate regulatory
system that emphasized trading. In short, EPA’s regulatory approach changed to
reflect the actual physical operation of pollutants rather than reflecting an
artificial reality anchored in state boundaries.

229. David Schoenbrod et al., Air Pollution: Building on the Successes, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 284, 284
(2008) (“In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Congress required the states to regulate air pollution
according to federal specifications.”).
230. Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975).
231. See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 79–80 (2011) (environmental programs of
cooperative federalism “would implode without the good faith participation of state environmental agencies”).
232. Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2014) (states must prohibit emission levels
that will contribute significantly to nonattainment or interference with maintenance of the air quality standards
in downwind states); id. § 7426(a)–(b) (downwind states could petition EPA to control interstate pollution); Id.
§ 7511c(a) (establishing ozone transport region composed of eastern states); id. § 7506(a) (authorizing EPA to
establish interstate transport regions for particular pollutants).
233. See Karl James Simon, The Application and Adequacy of the Clean Air Act in Addressing Interstate
Ozone Transport, 5 ENVTL. L. 120, 134 (1998).
234. See Kurt G. Kastorf, Cooperative Federalism: Is there a Trend Towards Uniform National Standards
Under the Clean Air Act?, 45 ABA TRENDS, no. 5, May/June 2014, at 6. (two recent court decisions regarding
SIPs “suggest a trend away from reliance on cooperative federalism and towards more uniform and stringent
national standards.”).
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2. Uniformity and Impartiality
The move from purely state-centered regulation also resulted in a second
change: a new emphasis on regulatory uniformity. As discussed above,235 EPA
FIPs now imposed multi-state trading systems upon sources and urged states to
adopt model trading rules. The Clean Air Act allows states to reject these systems
by placing their own mix of regulatory programs into a SIP, but the FIP programs
were attractive. To the extent that the FIPs remained in place, they brought a
much greater degree of uniformity and consistency to regulation of sources
among the states than in the SIP’s state-centered regulation.236
In crafting these FIPs, EPA was necessarily concerned with regulating impartially.237 It could not be seen as favoring sources in one state over another;
instead, EPA needed to build a level interstate playing field in which all sources
were treated fairly.238 Thus, while the FIPs certainly were regulatory in nature, at
the same time they established EPA as a kind of referee to ensure that sources
could compete fairly in the new interstate system.239
The uniformity wrought by the new FIPs modified an important feature of the
federalism underpinnings of the CAA. A traditional rationale for federalism cites
the forecasted benefits of diversity: the separate efforts of states would produce
new solutions to air-pollution problems.240 At the same time, states could make
diverse choices about which industries should bear the most stringent emission
controls. Now, however, diversity is demoted to a secondary role, subordinated to
the goal of interstate uniformity.

235. See supra section II.C.2.
236. In other actions EPA has recognized the need that it act consistently on a national basis in making
judgments about technology. See, e.g., Reid Gardner Generating Station, 77 Fed. Reg. at 50,938, (“Here,
contrary to the commenter’s assertion, we are exercising judgment within the parameters laid out in the CAA
and consistent with other actions nationally applying our regional haze regulations.”).
237. Shi-Ling Hsu, Fairness and Impartiality in Environmental Law Versus Efficiency in Environmental
Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 313 (2004) (“Perhaps the most familiar notion of fairness pertains to equality. In
environmental law, it often takes the form of a sense that the burdens and benefits of environmental protection
should be distributed equally among all polluters and all members of the public. This notion has been pervasive
in environmental law, not so much as a tool for engineering social change, but for ensuring that the burdens of
environmental problems are distributed equally.”).
238. Section 126 Petition, 71 Fed. Reg. at 25,339 (“This provides a level playing field, giving assurance to all
the affected downwind States that the upwind emissions reductions required under CAIR will be achieved on
time.”).
239. For example, EPA’s CAIR set variability limits which placed a cap on total emissions from EGUs in
individual states. Without those limits, total emissions from EGUs in a state could exceed the state’s emission
budget for that year. Transport Rule FIPs, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,212.
240. See Weiser, supra note 7, at 1698 (noting that “the cooperative federalism regulatory strategy makes
sense where the benefits of allowing for diversity in federal regulatory programs outweigh the benefits of
demanding uniformity in all situations.”).
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3. The Site of Technical Expertise
Another change concerns the application of technical expertise. Since 1970,
the CAA has partially relied on EPA’s expertise in analyzing methods of
controlling certain air pollutants. For example, the Act requires EPA to set
performance standards for new sources of air pollution,241 and EPA regulates
emissions from new automobiles.242 However, the Act assigned to the states the
task of regulating existing stationary sources. EPA was to play only a secondary
role here through its supervision of SIPs.243
The FIPs imposing interstate trading systems on existing sources, however,
enhance EPA’s role in the technical review of pollution control of stationary
sources. To implement these systems, EPA has to allocate initial trading rights to
individual sources in the trading market.244 The agency has generally chosen to
base that allocation on the types of reductions that individual sources could make
using reasonably available technological controls. EPA would estimate the
reductions that were feasible and then assign initial emission rights at levels
reflecting those controls. EPA’s expertise in pollution-control technology for
existing sources thus became central to this task.245
States do not have to accept EPA’s allocations; they can make their own
allocation choices and adopt a SIP based upon them. But rejecting EPA’s
conclusions would require considerable effort, and in that effort states were
unlikely to directly challenge EPA’s technical conclusions about the level of
pollution control available. Instead, states re-allocating initial trading rights
would just decide to favor certain sources over others. But whether an EPA or a
state allocation prevailed, the critical technological evaluations now occur at the
federal level for important categories of air pollution sources, such as power
plants.246
241. Clean Air Act § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2014) (requiring standards for categories of
stationary sources that “reflect[] the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best
system of emission reduction”).
242. Id. § 7521. The Administrator, however, may, under some circumstances, waive preemption to allow
state regulations to go into effect. Id. § 7543. Most waivers have concerned California regulations of automobile
emissions.
243. Hall v. EPA, 273 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001) (reviewing a SIP, “EPA must determine the extent of
pollution reductions that are required and determine whether the emissions reductions effected by the proposed
revisions will be adequate to the task.”).
244. B. Victor B. Flatt, Federal Climate Change Legislation - The Perspective from 2008, 3 ENVTL. &
ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 195, 195 (2008) (“Cap-and-trade is a system whereby the total amount of the
pollutant . . . is capped, the total allocation is distributed in some way, and those who own these allocations (the
rights to emit the gases) can trade them.”); B. Timothy Heinmiller, The Politics of “Cap and Trade” Policies, 47
NAT. RESOURCES J. 445, 450 (2007) (“The allocation process involves the assignment of resource access and use
rights to individuals within the boundaries of the established cap.”).
245. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 613 (1996)
(discussing which level of government is best equipped to develop technology standards).
246. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,665 (“[I]n making its BSER determination, the EPA examined not
only actions, technologies and measures already in use by EGUs and states, but also deliberately incorporated in
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THE PREVALENCE OF INCENTIVES

1. The Primacy of Market-Based Systems
The most important consequence of the FIPs has undoubtedly been the change
from command-and-control regulation to use of market-based trading systems.
Beginning with its acid rain program, EPA’s FIPs have imposed a series of
gradually broadened trading markets. Those markets exhibit several important
features and cause a number of significant consequences.
To begin with, the market-based trading systems partly alleviate the most
important consequences previously associated with FIPs: the prospect of intrusive, heavy-handed federal regulation. The cap-and-trade system circumvents
many of the bureaucratic problems inherent in the evasion plans, which imposed
and enforced controls on a wide variety of individual sources. Instead, once EPA
establishes the initial allocation of emissions and trading begins, market decisions dictate the responses by sources in the system.
Second, only EPA is well-positioned to create these types of interstate markets
by ensuring uniformity in the market-based systems imposed in individual FIPs
for different states. This market uniformity promises cost-savings to participants
by widening the number of potential trading partners. The Act does not prevent
states from participating in the creation of interstate markets without EPA
assistance, and some states have taken advantage of this possibility.247 Nonetheless, EPA can impose uniform markets in its FIPs and is better situated to manage
interstate trading as the market-runner.
Third, EPA is also positioned to coordinate the FIPs it has imposed for different
pollutants coming from a common group of sources. In effect, EPA can meld the
FIPs into a single, multi-pollutant market. By doing so, it unifies the system,
simplifies compliance by sources, and avoids duplicative bureaucracy.
In short, EPA’s position under the CAA has situated it to create uniform,
efficient trading markets. These markets place economic incentives at the center
of state efforts to comply.
2. Incentivizing Participation
As originally conceived, FIPs were viewed as temporary solutions that would
merely fill gaps where state participation had faltered. States remained the
primary regulators, and the Clean Air Act assumed that states would move to
regain their regulatory authority by remedying the SIP’s deficiency that led to the
FIP. Individual pollution sources would merely follow the dictates of either the

its identification of the BSER the unique way in which affected EGUs actually operate in providing electricity
services.”).
247. The primary example is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the Northeast. See REGIONAL
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
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SIP or the FIP, depending on which plan was in force at a particular time. EPA’s
initial reluctance to use its FIP authority in part reflected this limited view of a
FIP’s function.248
Now, in contrast, EPA sees FIPs as important affirmative tools for achieving
environmental improvement. Indeed, at least in the case of pollutants with
significant interstate effects, the agency employs FIPs as the primary tool for
effecting change and has crafted them to at least partially supersede the role of
SIPs in addressing those effects. As a result, EPA no longer views the FIP as a
temporary device but as implementing a long term, economically based, and
more efficient regulatory system.249 It now prefers the FIP-based program and
actively seeks both to implement it and to incentivize its permanence.
To do so, the agency employs several measures. One is the use of model
trading rules that EPA has made available to states.250 Rather than expend the
extensive resources needed to craft an alternative set of regulations in a SIP251
that could contain traditional command-and-control requirements, states can
simply adopt and implement EPA’s model trading rule. In the event states so act,
EPA also advances another of its goals, regulatory uniformity.
A second, more coercive incentivizing device is the “FIP-first” preclusive
approach. Rather than utilize the full two-year period authorized by the CAA to
adopt a FIP, EPA now moves expeditiously to impose FIPs. Indeed, it has done so
even when states had no real opportunity to craft a complying SIP after a finding
that a state plan violated the Act.252 Once the FIP is installed, states then must
choose whether to replace it with a separate system or take the administratively
easier route of leaving the FIP wholly or partially in place as the governing
system.

248. See Alan C. Waltner, Paradise Delayed—The Continuing Saga of the Los Angeles Basin Federal Clean
Air Implementation Plan, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 247 (1995–1996) (detailing EPA’s reluctance to
impose a FIP in Southern California).
249. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only From a National Perspective) For Federal
Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225, 261 (1997) (“State implementation of federal
policy, or ‘cooperative federalism,’ may reduce the costs of dual regulation when federal regulation is
imposed.”).
250. Rule To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule);
Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions to the NOX SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162, 25,289 (May 12, 2005)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78 and 96) (“The CAIR ozone-season NOX model rule
provides incentive for early emissions reductions by allowing the banking of pre-2009 NOX SIP Call allowances
into the CAIR ozone-season program.”).
251. Paul D. Brown, Lofty Goals, Questioned Motives, and Proffered Justifications: Regional Transport of
Ground-Level Ozone, and the EPA’s NOX SIP Call, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 923, 930 (Spring 1999) (FIPs “can benefit
a state that does not have the resources and/or the inclination to draft or revise a SIP.”).
252. See Action to Ensure Authority to Issue Permits Under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
Program to Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Federal Implementation Plan, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,246, 82,249
(Dec. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (commenter stating that the FIP implicitly encourages states
to surrender sovereign position as responsible regulators under the dual federal-state system of the PSD
program).

2016]

FEDERAL IMPLEMENTATION PLANS

681

The FIP-first approach also substantially alters the incentives of the regulated
industry. Traditional environmental regulation for the most part assumed that
regulated industry prefers state to federal regulation. The Supreme Court’s 1976
decision in Union Electric v. EPA253 reflects this premise about the Act’s
regulatory structure. Sources will have to compete for allowed pollution emissions at the state level during the drafting of SIPs. A state’s choice of emission
levels can be politically driven; it is free to favor certain industries over others in
allocating pollution reductions.
Now, however, if EPA finds a deficiency, it can impose a FIP before a state can
complete the process of addressing that deficiency. Emission sources then may
adapt to the federal trading system, and the economic efficiency of that system in
turn confers benefits on those sources and, most importantly, promises reductions
in pollution-control costs. Moreover, if the FIP’s system authorizes trading across
state lines, sources have additional compliance options available to them that can
lower their costs. And the trading system lightens the regulatory burdens on
sources. Primarily, the sources need only concern themselves with measuring
their emissions and ensuring that they have sufficient credits to cover those
allotted emissions at the end of the trading system’s accounting period.
In short, sources may well prefer to continue under the federal trading system
rather than suffer the dislocation of adapting to a new set of controls imposed by a
state in its SIP. For example, by the time the Supreme Court overturned EPA’s
mercury rule,254 sources had largely implemented the rule, and some sought to
have the rule’s trading system remain in effect while EPA remedied any defect.255
The consistency and the stability of the FIP system appeal to sources and
incentivize them to advocate that the FIP remain in place.
3. Stimulating Private Innovation
Finally, EPA’s use of market-based trading systems in its FIPs has altered the
location of innovation in complying with the Act. Traditionally, the Act placed
the center of innovation for existing sources at the state government level.256
Congress thought that, as states crafted implementation plans to attain the air

253. 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
254. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015). The court found that EPA should have considered
compliance costs at the first stage of the agency’s regulatory analysis.
255. See Daniel Moore & Chris Potter, Pa. Impact May be ‘Minimal’ as Supreme Court Overturns EPA’s
Mercury Rule, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (June 29, 2015, 11:50 PM), http://powersource.post-gazette.com/powersource/
policy-powersource/2015/06/29/Supreme-Court-overturns-EPA-mercury-power-plant-regulations-MATS-emiss
ions/stories/201506300088 (“The implications of the court’s ruling, analysts agreed, are unclear, and it’s
expected to have little immediate effect on current mix of power generation. The rule was finalized in December
2011 and took effect over a three-year compliance period beginning April 2012. Because most coal plants were
subject to comply with the rule by April 16 of this year, many of the plants have already closed.”).
256. See Babich, supra note 13, at 27 (“One policy justification for this system is that it allows for state
experimentation and variety within federal mandates’ ambit.”).
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quality standards, the Act would spur innovation and creativity in formulating
control methods. The Act thus drew on the postulate of federalism that sees states
serving as “laboratories” of experimentation in seeking solutions to social
problems,257 and the Act did produce some state-led innovation. However, states
often proved recalcitrant when facing the kind of economic burdens associated
with pollution controls that would be necessary to attain the air quality standards.
EPA’s use of FIPs has altered the center of innovation. The market trading
systems favored by EPA in FIPs do not rely on state innovation; instead, those
systems establish economic incentives that drive sources of pollution to innovate.
Indeed, the creation of incentives to produce least-cost pollution control is the
signature feature of such systems.258 In short, sources in that market, not states,
stimulate innovation.259
With this altered federal framework from FIPs in mind, we now examine how
its features will affect the FIP proposed for the Clean Power Plan.
IV. PATHWAYS

FOR

FEDERAL CLEAN POWER IMPLEMENTATION PLANS

On October 23, 2015, EPA finalized its rules that establish emission guidelines
regulating carbon emissions from power plants, the CPP.260 A large number of
states had previously signaled opposition to the plan,261 and 27 states responded
to the rules by initiating litigation challenging them.262 Anticipating that such
states would “just say no” to the rules and refuse to comply, EPA also released its

257. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (as states address the issue of gun policies
on campuses, “the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role as
laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.”).
258. Alice Kaswan, Centralizing Cap-and-Trade? State Controls Within a Federal Greenhouse Gas
Cap-and-Trade Program, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 343, 351 (2010) (“Cap-and-trade programs are intended to achieve
administrative efficiency by relieving government agencies of the administrative burdens associated with
developing regulatory standards, imposing them in permits, and enforcing permit requirements.”).
259. See Esty, supra note 245, at 622 (“The use of economic-incentive-based regulatory tools can further
loosen the grip of federal regulators and give broad scope to private actors to determine how best to meet
environmental goals.”).
260. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,662.
261. See Peter S. Glaser et al., EPA’s Section 111(d) Carbon Rule: What if States Just Said No? 15 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 4 at 5, 6 (2014).
262. West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015). Twenty seven states ultimately
challenged the Clean Power Plan: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Petition
for Review, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/
files/content/2015.10.23_states_111d_petition_for_review.pdf. One state, North Dakota, filed a separate suit.
See Petition for Review, North Dakota v. EPA, No 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.edf.org/
sites/default/files/content/2015.10.23_nd_petition_for_review.pdf.
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proposal for a FIP to effectuate the rules if states remained opposed.263 EPA
stated that it would implement a FIP if a state missed a deadline for responding to
the rules.264
The FIP for the CPP is a challenging undertaking that would alter the
traditional patterns of electricity generation in the United States. The proposed
FIP has generated thousands of public comments and raised numerous design
issues about the FIP’s regulatory system.265 The proposed FIP, however, is not a
sui generis document; instead, it derives from EPA’s earlier efforts to implement
FIPs that this Article has analyzed. The evolution of FIPs offers a lens through
which to evaluate at least some features of the proposed CPP FIP at a macrolevel. Examining the CPP FIP in light of that evolution illuminates certain
pathways that EPA is likely to take in finalizing its FIP program and identifies
several important tradeoffs that EPA must make in accomplishing the FIP’s goal.
A.

THE PAST OF FEDERAL PLANNING AS PROLOGUE

The evolution of the FIP process leads to three general conclusions about the
CPP FIP proposal. First, the FIP proceeds logically from EPA’s earlier FIPs that
regulated power plants. For example, it largely regulates the same sources
affected by EPA’s mercury rule and CSAPR.266 The FIP also proposes to use the
same tracking system that EPA has employed in the past beginning with its acid
rain regulations,267 a system generally recognized as effective and workable.
Second, some observers had suggested that EPA might propose a draconian
FIP as a means of coercing states into adopting implementation plans and thereby
avoiding the FIP.268 Consistent with its earlier affirmative FIPs, however, EPA
rejected that path. Instead, it proposed a FIP that embodies the same structure and
themes found in its recent hybrid and melded FIPs. The CPP FIP centers on
creating trading markets and incentivizing participation by both states and power

263. Proposed Clean Power Plan FIP, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,966.
264. Id. at 64,974 (“If a state does not submit a final state plan or initial plan submittal, or if either a final state
plan or an initial plan submittal does not meet the requirements . . . the agency will take the appropriate steps to
finalize and implement a federal plan for that state’s EGUs.”).
265. The design issues include concerns over the reliability of the electricity generating and transmitting
system, methods of market oversight, “leakage” of emissions to outside of the regulatory system, set-asides for
renewable energy, banking of credits, and borrowing of credits from future periods.
266. Proposed Clean Power Plan FIP, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,985 (“Existing fossil fuel-fired EGUs, such as those
covered in this proposal, are or will be potentially impacted by several other rules recently finalized or proposed
by the EPA. These rules include the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) [and] the CSAPR . . . .”).
267. Tracking Systems in the Clean Power Plan, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOL. (Feb. 2016),
http://www.c2es.org/publications/tracking-systems-clean-power-plan.
268. Nathan Richardson and Arthur G. Fraas, What to Watch For in EPA’s Final Clean Power Plan: What
Will EPA Do If States Won’t Play Ball?, RES. FOR THE FUTURE (July 20, 2015), http://www.rff.org/blog/2015/whatwatch-epa-s-final-clean-power-plan-what-will-epa-do-if-states-won-t-play-ball (“Some have argued that EPA
should develop a draconian federal plan—by, for example, including no or only limited ability to trade
emissions credits . . . .”).
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companies. In that sense, it also draws upon the success of the state-created
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), whose trading system produced a
forty percent reduction in carbon pollution from the power sector since 2005.269
Third, the lessons from the evolution of the FIPs can only carry EPA so far, for
the CPP FIP involves more complexity than EPA’s earlier FIP efforts. To take just
one example, EPA must confront whether and how carbon savings from renewable power, energy efficiency, and biomass can be calculated and then factored
into the trading system. More generally, EPA faces a situation in which it must
balance conflicting goals. On the one hand, EPA seeks to create a trading system
that is simple and transparent so as to facilitate the agency’s implementation of it.
At the same time, however, it also wants to fashion a trading system that will
minimize compliance costs and afford sources a wide array of compliance
options. Here, the features of the CPP FIP will inevitably increase the FIP’s
complexity and thus render it more difficult to administer.
B.

TRADEOFFS IN THE PLAN’S DESIGN

In creating a Clean Power Plan FIP, EPA faces the difficult challenge of
balancing these conflicting factors. Important tradeoffs will occur in five areas.
1. Structuring the Trading System
The most important tradeoffs arise out of the design of the trading system. Two
general types of systems are possible. The first is a “mass-based” system in which
a FIP would impose a single cap on total emissions from a state.270 Sources
would then receive allowances that can be used or traded. The second system, a
“rate-based” system, requires sources of emissions in a state to meet individual
emission limits assigned to each source.271

269. David Gahl et al., The Clean Power Plan Puzzle: The Future of Efforts to Control Climate Pollution in
the Northeast, PACE ENERGY AND CLIMATE CTR. 2 (2015), http://energy.pace.edu/sites/default/files/publications/
Pace%20Energy%20and%20Climate%20Center%20CPP-RGGI-Policy-Brief%20Nov%202015.pdf.
270. Proposed Clean Power Plan FIP, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,971 (“In a mass-based program, the EPA would
create a state emissions budget equal to the total tons of CO2 allowed to be emitted by the affected EGUs in each
state, consistent with the mass goals established in the EGs [Emission Guidelines]. The EPA would initially
distribute the allowances within each state budget—less three proposed allowance set-asides—to the affected
EGUs based on their historical generation. Allowances may then be transferred, bought, and sold on the open
market, or banked for future use. The compliance obligation on each of the affected EGUs is to surrender the
number of allowances sufficient to cover the EGU’s respective emissions at the end of a given compliance
period.”).
271. Id. at 64,970 (“In a rate-based program, affected EGUs must meet an emission standard, derived from
the EGs, expressed as a rate of pounds of CO2 per megawatt hour (lbs/MWh). If sources emit above their
assigned rate, they must acquire a sufficient number of emission rate credits (ERC), each representing a
zero-emitting megawatt hour (MWh), to bring their rate of emissions into compliance. Emission rate credits
(ERCs) may be generated by affected EGUs or by other entities that supply zero- or low-emitting electricity . . . .”).
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From an administrative standpoint, the mass-based system is EPA’s more
attractive option. The agency has accumulated considerable experience with this
type of system in its acid rain program, as well as with several of the more recent
FIP trading programs, including CSAPR.272 Furthermore, both RGGI and the
California GHG trading program have successfully implemented this type of
system.273 The mass-based system also is simpler than the rate-based system for a
number of reasons. For example, allowances under a mass-based system issue at
the beginning of any compliance period. In contrast, Emission Rate Credits in a
rate-based system issue only after the savings in emissions have been accomplished and verified.
EPA has stated that it will choose between the two trading systems and
implement only one of them in its CPP FIP.274 Given the complexities of the
rate-based system, the choice of a mass-based system seems the more likely
outcome. That system offers both familiarity and ease of implementation, two
important factors in the FIP undertaking. Even if EPA so chooses, however, for
several reasons the system still will trend toward increased complexity and
corresponding difficulty of administration.
First, in its Clean Power Plan, EPA included both a mass-based system and a
rate-based system as two model systems that it encouraged states to adopt. If both
systems are in place in different states, a single unified system becomes difficult
to create.
Moreover, EGUs will press for the broadest array of trading opportunities
possible, a goal that EPA will share. In doing so, however, those sources are not
concerned with the administrative difficulties that a more complex system will
pose for EPA. Thus, a number of them have urged that EPA should take steps to
unify the mass-based and rate-based systems by allowing inter-system trading,275
a step EPA has so far resisted. Some have also argued that a state subject to a FIP
should be able to choose between two types of system.276 Still others want EPA to

272. Id. (“The EPA has more than two decades of experience implementing federally-administered
mass-based emissions budget trading programs including the Acid Rain Program (ARP) sulfur dioxide (SO2)
trading program, the Nitrogen Oxides (NOX) Budget Trading Program, CAIR, and CSAPR.”).
273. McKinstry & Varnum, supra note 53, at 11008 (“Mass-based trading programs have been employed by
California and the nine states in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).”).
274. Proposed Clean Power Plan FIP, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,970 (“The EPA currently intends to finalize a single
approach—i.e., either a rate-based or a mass-based approach—in all promulgated federal plans for particular
states in order to enhance the consistency of the federal trading program, achieve economies of scale through a
single, broad trading program, ensure efficient administration of the program, and simplify compliance planning
for affected EGUs.”).
275. Lee Logan, Many Seek Broad GHG Market Under FIP, But Split on Approach, Leakage, INSIDE
EPA/CLIMATE (Jan. 25, 2016) (Electric Reliability Coordinating Council stating that EPA should develop a
methodology that would allow trading between rate-and mass-based states and noting that other stakeholders
are developing such methodologies).
276. See Comments of the Am. Pub. Power Ass’n on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s “Federal
Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electric Utility Generating Units Constructed on or
Before January 8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework Regulations” Proposed Rule, at 38
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finalize both systems and then impose one or the other in a particular state’s FIP
depending on local circumstances.277
EPA’s history with FIPs suggests that it will favor a mass-based FIP and likely
reject inter-system trading. The agency’s past experience lies with that type of
system, and it will try to minimize the implementation risks as it embarks on the
CPP FIPs. This choice will limit the options available to complying sources but
will simplify EPA’s administration of the FIPs. Of course, the trading world
created by EPA will still have two types of systems if at least some states choose
to implement a rate-based system. But that world will be less complex than if
EPA endorses both systems and tries to meld them.
2. Enticing State Participation
As discussed above in this Article,278 EPA has designed its recent FIPs to
incentivize states to adopt the system in the FIP. Unsurprisingly, it has followed
this same pattern in its proposed Clean Power Plan FIP. EPA has proposed model
trading systems that will be finalized before states must inform EPA of how they
will comply with the Clean Power Plan rules.279 EPA has incentivized state
adoption of these trading systems: if a state adopts one of these model trading
systems, then its SIP would be “presumptively approvable” by EPA.280 EPA also
has proposed that states use its tested “Allowance Tracking and Compliance
System” for tracking, rather than inventing a new tracking system.281 Overall,
EPA’s proposal contains incentives that would smooth state compliance with the
CPP rules.
The nature and depth of the state opposition to the entire Clean Power Plan
enterprise, however, is reminiscent of the evasion-FIP era. Numerous state
officials have vehemently objected to the objectives of the CPP and, thus, to all
attempts to implement it. One state, for example, has allegedly decided to
deliberately submit an inadequate SIP so as to test EPA’s basic authority under

(Jan. 21, 2016) (“EPA should allow states that are to become subject to a federal plan to choose which type of
emission trading scheme best suits their individual circumstances and the circumstances facing their EGUs.”).
277. See Comments of the Edison Elec. Inst. on Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Electric Generating Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments
to Framework Regulations, at 6 (Jan. 21, 2016) (encouraging EPA to finalize both rate- and mass-based plans
and “carefully assess the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether to impose a rate- or mass-based
plan.”).
278. See supra text accompanying note 215.
279. Proposed Clean Power Plan FIP, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,970 (proposed mass-based and rate-based systems
“serve as two proposed model trading rules that states may adopt or tailor in designing their own plans.”).
280. Id. at 64,969 (“A state program that adheres to the model trading rule provisions . . . would be
presumptively approvable.”).
281. Id. at 64,997 (“The EPA proposes that the rate-based federal trading program use the agency’s
already-existing Allowance Tracking and Compliance System (ATCS).”); id. at 65,029 (“The EPA proposes that
the mass-based trading program use an ATCS operated essentially the same way as the existing systems that are
currently in use for CSAPR . . . .”).
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section 111 to regulate power sources.282 Under these circumstances, the incentives in EPA’s FIP may well prove insufficient to overcome the state opposition.
Nonetheless, one countervailing factor may operate to undercut this wall of
state opposition. The EGUs are caught between EPA’s Clean Power Plan and the
state political actors who object to that plan. If the courts uphold the CPP, it is
those sources that ultimately must comply with the emission limits established by
the Plan and that are subject to enforcement action for failing to do so.283
Accordingly, a primary concern of those sources will be securing compliance
options that, to the extent possible, reduce uncertainty.
Furthermore, utility companies employ long time horizons in planning to meet
predicted power needs.284 If state opposition begins to foreclose the time needed
for that planning, utilities will likely use their considerable political influence in
states to push back and avoid that result. They may actually favor either a FIP or a
state plan that adopts an EPA model trading rule, both of which are avenues that
may offer a surer road to compliance.
3. The Distributive Consequences of Allocating Rights
There remains the fundamental issue of whether, in the end, the oppositional
states will actually prove willing to cede to EPA the authority to allocate
emissions at the outset of the trading market. Trading systems require an initial
allocation of trading rights to those entities that will participate in the market.
This allocation has important distributional consequences, for the individual
allocations confer significant economic value upon recipients.285 Furthermore,
the allocations shape the operation of the trading market by assigning “starting
places” to participants. States that refuse to comply with the CPP would opt out of

282. States: A Roundup of ESPS Compliance News, INSIDE EPA/CLIMATE (Feb. 4, 2016) (North Carolina is
“commit[ted] to submit an inadequate plan with the goal of testing EPA’s legal authority—though the state’s
largest utility, Duke Energy, recently called on the Tar Heel State to take a less confrontational approach.”).
283. Proposed Clean Power Plan FIP, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,984 (“Under the proposed federal plan, title V
permits for sources with affected EGUs will need to include any new applicable requirements that the plan
places on the affected EGUs. The EPA, however, is not proposing any permitting requirements independent of
those that would be required under title V of the CAA and the regulations implementing title V . . . .”).
284. Rachel Wilson & Bruce Biewald, Best Practices in Electric Utility Integrated Resource Planning,
REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT (June 21, 2013), http://www.raponline.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/
rapsynapse-wilsonbiewald-bestpracticesinirp-2013-jun-21.pdf (Integrated resource planning “has been an accepted way in which utilities can create long-term resource plans.”).
285. See Julie DeMeester & Sarah Adair, EPA’s Clean Power Plan: Understanding and Evaluating the
Proposed Federal Plan and Model Rules, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11155, 11158 (2015)
(“Allowance allocation is a key design consideration for any allowance trading system because allowances
represent an asset with monetary value (equal to the market price of an allowance)”); Robert N. Stavins, A
Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 316 (2008)
(“The cap-and-trade system will create a new commodity, a CO2 allowance, which has value because of its
scarcity (fostered by the cap on allowable emissions).”).
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this allocation process. The FIP that EPA would then promulgate will deeply
intrude into state prerogatives in establishing the trading market.
EPA theoretically can employ a number of allocation methods. For example,
allocations could be based on heat (i.e., fuel use) rates, historical emission rates,
or historic generation.286 Allocations also could occur through auctions to the
highest bidder,287 and these auctions would raise considerable revenue. EPA has
raised the possibility of auctions but quickly noted that it would have to deposit
the proceeds in the federal Treasury.288 In the end, the proposed CPP FIP tracks
EPA’s past practice of using historical generation as the allocation method for a
mass-based system.289 EPA has generally viewed historical allocations as fair and
likely to minimize objections to the allocation method.
More than other issues, the allocation question will force objecting states to
think hard before absolutely refusing to comply and subjecting themselves to a
FIP. Traditionally, states found that one of the most appealing aspects of SIPs
under the Clean Air Act was the states’ discretion to allocate emissions limitations. This was an important, jealously guarded prerogative of the states.
Recognizing this history and seeking to minimize the political fallout from a
CPP FIP, EPA has strongly suggested that states may wish to take back the
allocation process from EPA even while allowing the remainder of the FIP to stay
in place.290 Given the distributional significance of the allocation process, even
states adamantly opposed to FIPs may be unable to resist this offer. However,
they will have to make that choice quickly. Once the initial allocations by EPA
take effect, a later effort by a state to rearrange the allocations would prove quite
difficult and upset the now-settled economic expectations of sources relying upon
those allocations.
4. Coercion and Timing
EPA’s evolution in using FIPs included a practice of forcing FIPs upon states
even when, as a practical matter, they had little chance to comply.291 The
Supreme Court affirmed this practice in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation,
L.P.,292 finding that the “cooperative federalism” of the CAA did not require EPA

286. Proposed Clean Power Plan FIP, 80 Fed. Reg. at 65,017. See also DeMeester & Adair, supra note 285,
at 11158 (“The EPA recognizes that there are many other ways to distribute allowances, such as allocations to
affected EGUs based on heat rates, emissions rates, and future generation; allocations to load-serving entities; or
auctions.”).
287. Auction Information, CA. AIR RES. BD., Auction and Reserve Sale Information, http://www.arb.ca.gov/
cc/capandtrade/auction/auction.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2016).
288. Proposed Clean Power Plan FIP, 80 Fed. Reg. at 65,018.
289. Id. at 65,015.
290. Id. at 64,971 (“The EPA is also proposing that a jurisdiction may choose to replace the federal plan
allocation provisions with its own allowance allocation provisions.”).
291. See supra section III.C.4.
292. 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
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to offer states a period of time to comply through preparation of their own SIPs
before EPA imposed a federal plan.
In addition to positive efforts to incentivize state participation, EPA also
included this form of timing coercion in its proposed CPP FIP. First, it did not
promise to provide states with an opportunity to comment on the content of a FIP
before imposing it. Second, EPA’s proposed FIP rules declared that if a state did
not meet the initial submittal deadline of September 6, 2016, EPA would
immediately impose its FIP.293
The short deadline imposed by EPA seems somewhat inconsistent with EPA’s
other attempts to entice state participation through more positive incentives.
However, subsequent events ultimately robbed the CPP of the effectiveness of
this initial coercive timeline. On February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court unexpectedly granted a stay of the implementation of the Clean Power Plan.294 That stay
will remain in effect until the challenges to the plan are decided, which renders
moot the CPP’s original deadlines for compliance. As such, states no longer had
to be concerned about the September 2016 SIP deadline and the immediate
promulgation of a FIP. Additionally, the recent presidential election casts a cloud
of uncertainty over the future of the CPP should it survive the ongoing legal
challenges.295
5. Administering the System
Ample evidence exists that EPA can effectively administer a trading market
without overly taxing agency resources.296 However, the level of state opposition
to the CPP raises the question of whether EPA will be able to effectively
administer a FIP after adopting it. The potential administrative problems with the
CPP FIP lie in at least two areas.
First, the FIP adds complexity by requiring EPA to evaluate energy-saving
methods, calculate the savings, and then incorporate those savings into the
market. Rate-based systems present additional challenges in their implementation, particularly the concerns about validating Emission Rate Credits. EPA might
avoid some of those difficulties by opting only for a mass-based system in its FIP.

293. Proposed Clean Power Plan FIP, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,975 (“It is the agency’s intention to promulgate
federal plans promptly for states who do not submit plans or initial submittals by September 6, 2016.”).
294. West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (mem.) (order issuing stay of Clean Power Plan).
295. Chelsea Harvey, Trump has Vowed to Kill the Clean Power Plan. Here’s How He Might—and Might
Not—Succeed, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/
2016/11/11/trump-has-vowed-to-kill-the-clean-power-plan-heres-how-he-might-and-might-not-succeed.
296. William F. Pedersen, Should EPA Use Emissions Averaging or Cap and Trade to Implement § 111(d) of
the Clean Air Act?, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10731, 10734 (2013) (“The acid rain program has
reduced emissions at far less cost than predicted, with minimal enforcement problems, and with an EPA
implementing staff of 50 people.”).
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Even here, however, the agency must deal with the possibility of “leakage”297 in
the regulatory system, i.e., how to prevent utilities from complying by simply
building new sources of energy production that use natural gas and, as new
sources, are not subject to the FIP under section 111.298 The CPP will then
perversely incentivize utilities to comply by building new natural gas sources that
would result in an increase in GHG emissions instead of a decrease. These
additional implementation challenges are substantial.
Second, EPA must actually operate the permit system if a state completely opts
out, and here the Tenth Amendment constraints present a significant barrier. As
discussed above,299 the Supreme Court’s recent Tenth Amendment decisions go
far toward applying a strict anti-commandeering principle. If, as the Printz case
holds, federal law cannot even require local law enforcement authorities to accept
materials relating to gun purchases,300 it is hard to see how EPA could command
state governments to administer parts of its FIP.
EPA proposes to modify the pre-existing permits issued under Title V of the
Clean Air Act to include emission limits imposed through the Clean Power Plan
FIP.301 This step should help smooth the transition of the FIP’s requirements into
the current system. But can EPA require states to undertake even this limited
step? The answer under Printz may well be no, and the oppositional states can be
counted on to litigate the question.
EPA has subtly recognized this lurking issue. The CPP FIP suggests that states
may wish to accept delegation of the administrative aspects of the plan and
become the primary implementers of it. In other words, the substantive aspects of
EPA’s plan would remain in effect, but the states would administer them.
Normally, states should find that offer attractive. Many states already administer
the Title V permit system, and those states would generally prefer that permits
governing critical sources of state electricity remain in the hands of state rather
than federal officials. But the high level of political resistance to FIPs may cause
states to refuse even this limited delegation. If so, the refusal would leave EPA to
ponder how it can administer the day-to-day permit functions of its trading
system in a large number of states.

297. See DeMeester & Adair, supra note 285, at 11156 (“‘Leakage’ occurs when an environmental policy
causes an increase of pollution outside its scope, a phenomenon that effectively reduces its environmental
benefits. Under the Clean Power Plan, the EPA is concerned about the possibility of leakage of carbon emissions
from affected units to new sources that would not be covered [by the Plan].”).
298. Proposed Clean Power Plan FIP, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,977 (“The final [Emission Guidelines] specify the
concern of leakage, which is defined . . . as the potential of an alternative form of implementation of the BSER
(e.g., the rate-based and mass-based state goals) to create a larger incentive for affected EGUs to shift generation
to new fossil fuel-fired EGUs relative to what would occur when the implementation of the BSER took the form
of standards of performance . . . .”).
299. See supra section I.D.1.
300. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
301. Proposed Clean Power Plan FIP, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,984 (discussing how new requirements will be
inserted into Title V permits and how allowances may be traded without permit revisions).
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CONCLUSION
EPA’s Clean Power Plan FIP draws on a long history of FIPs adopted by EPA,
and as shown in this Article, this history reveals that EPA’s use of FIPs has
evolved considerably. EPA has now used FIPs as affirmative vehicles to implement the Clean Air Act, and the history of EPA’s use of FIPs offers one means of
evaluating some of the choices available under the proposed Clean Power Plan
FIP. It reveals points at which the FIP’s implementation presents tradeoffs
between policies that the program attempts to promote and difficult issues of
administration. In short, despite EPA’s success with affirmative FIPs, in important respects the Clean Power Plan FIP will enter significant stretches of
uncharted regulatory territory.

